Response of the IMF and the World Bank to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis in a globalising world by unknown
  
Response of the IMF and the World Bank to the 
Great Recession and the Euro Sovereign Crisis in a 
Globalising World 
 
 
By Tankiso Abel Thibane 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Commerce in Economics at the Nelson Mandela University 
 
 
April 2018 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Emeritus Prof C.V.R Wait 
 
 i 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I, Tankiso Abel Thibane (Student Number: 213518333), hereby declare that the dissertation 
for Master of Commerce in Economics (Research) is my own work and that it has not 
previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to 
another University or for another qualification. However, the following articles, based on this 
research, were presented: 
 Thibane, T.A. and Wait, C.V.R. (2017a). Revisiting the Origins of Globalization: A 
Comparative Study Between the Drivers of Globalization During the Earlier and Current 
Period. Presented at the Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa. 
Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 30 August-1 September 2017.  
 Thibane, T.A. and Wait, C.V.R. (2017b). During and After the Great Recession: The Role 
of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization 
in Respect of Economic Globalization. Presented at the Biennial Conference of the 
Economic Society of South Africa. Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 30 August-1 
September 2017.  
 
………………………….   
Tankiso Abel Thibane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Emeritus Professor Charles Wait from the Nelson 
Mandela University Department of Economics who has been patient with me while 
completing this work, and whose comments were quite valuable in improving the standard of 
this research output. 
The comments from Professor Ferreira from the Nelson Mandela University Department of 
Development Studies and my colleague Ms. Pamela Halse who is a Senior Economist from 
the Competition Commission South Africa, have also assisted me in compiling this research 
report. 
I am indebted to both the National Research Foundation Innovation and the Nelson Mandela 
University Masters Research Grants, for the financial support for the period of this study. 
The support and love given to me by my family and friends when completing this research 
cannot be ignored. 
Lastly, I would like to give thanks to God the Almighty for the strength in times when I felt 
weary and had it not been for Him, the conducting of this research wouldn’t have been 
possible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
Abstract 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) now the World Bank, were created in the mid-1940s. The IMF was 
tasked to manage the post-war international monetary system, while the World Bank’s role 
during its early years was to provide development finance to war-torn Europe. These 
institutions reformed some of their roles to make them relevant to the globalising world over 
the years and also responded to several post-war crises. Since these two institutions carry out 
their roles in a globalising world, this study has revealed that globalisation has different 
interpretations as many researchers refer to the economic and non-economic explanations of 
its meaning. Globalisation is also a historical process as it traces back several years ago. 
Since approximately the mid-2000s, the global economy experienced two economic crises, 
namely the US sub-prime financial crisis that later became the Great Recession and the Euro 
sovereign crisis. The two economic crises spread to other countries globally that were 
interconnected into the global economy regarding international trade, investment and 
banking. These two crisis events required responses from the IMF and the World Bank.  
The two institutions displayed a variety of strengths and weaknesses in dealing with the 
recession and the Euro crisis. The lending of both these institutions has been their strength as 
they have managed to expand their lending capacity during the two crisis periods examined. 
The IMF’s crisis intervention time frames have also been its strength, as the speed in which it 
has approved financial assistance requests has been within reasonable time frames.  
The IMF’s new lending instruments have been its weakness, as the success of these 
instruments has not been fully tested so far. This is because of the little use of the IMF’s new 
lending instruments. The IMF’s crisis prevention efforts through the use of its surveillance 
tools have also been its flaw. This is based on the fact that it has failed to prevent the US 
financial crisis (later the Great Recession) and the Euro sovereign crisis.  
Overall, this study found that these institutions played a significant role in responding to the 
Great Recession and Euro sovereign crisis as their strengths outweigh their weaknesses. 
However, the weaknesses of the IMF confirm that it needs to reform its role and learn from 
its flaws in the future. 
Key words: Euro sovereign crisis, Globalisation, Great Recession, IMF, World Bank 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
This research project focuses on two international institutions, namely the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank1 that were established more than seventy years ago. 
A notable number of publications between the 1990s and 2016, report on the early history and 
original objectives of these institutions. These reviews of the history serve as the background to 
the analyses undertaken by the researchers concerned and will serve to introduce this research 
project. 
Preceding the First World War of 1914-1918, the global economy had few international 
institutions and Pax Britannica supported them (Baldwin, 2016:97). These institutions included 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (1863) (Palmieri, 2012:1274), the International 
Telecommunication Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874) (VanGrasstek, 2013:9).  
The period before the war was also associated with unprecedented economic growth in regions 
such as Europe (Chilosi & Federico, 2015:1). Trade increased rapidly as the growth of 
international trade averaged 3.5% per annum between 1870 and 1913 (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 
1996:5).  
After the First World War and leading up to the Great Depression of 1929-1933, there was 
increasing international economic instability. Markets were shrinking through competitive 
devaluation of currencies (Fritz-Krockow & Ramlogan, 2007:4) and many countries adopted 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies that restricted international trade. These policies meant that 
while countries desired to export their products, they did not wish to import products from other 
countries (Pradhan, 2012:75).  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The World Bank was known as the International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (IBRD) when it was 
established in 1944. 
 2 
 
In the early 1930s, there were efforts aimed at lifting the global economy out of the depression. 
These efforts included the World Monetary and Economic Conference held in June 1933 in 
London. This conference was made possible by the League of Nations later replaced by the 
United Nations (UN), where sixty-six countries met to discuss the future of the global economy. 
Regrettably, their efforts were in vain because the United States (US) disagreed with the 
European idea of returning to the fixed exchange rate system (Viju & Kerr, 2012:1366-1368).  
Towards the end of the Second World War of 1939-45, forty-four countries, headed by the US 
and the United Kingdom (UK), entered into negotiations in July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. This was to restore international economic relationships after the war (Eichengreen 
et al. 1993a:593; Weiss, 2010:108). These negotiations are described as the most ambitious 
economic negotiations in history (Conway, 2014:ix). 
The negotiations were successful as two institutions were formalised, namely the IMF and the 
World Bank (Peet, 2009:36). The broader mandate of these institutions was not only limited to 
the restoration of the war-disrupted international economic relationships, as it included measures 
to prevent the Great Depression from being repeated (Milner, 2005:836; Ahmad, 2012:125-126).  
The primary objective of the IMF was to manage the post-war international monetary system and 
to ensure that it worked well (Bordo & James, 2000:13). The World Bank was responsible for 
the post-war reconstruction of Europe (Peet, 2009:127) and to address the developmental 
problems of the global economy (Clemens & Kremer, 2016:53).  
The above historical facts are meant as the background to the formulating of the problem 
statement, research question and research objectives. 
1.2 Problem statement 
The role the IMF and the World Bank play in the global economy gives rise to two opposing 
views, first, in respect of the developing countries and second, regarding the developed 
countries.  
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The first view is that these institutions are responsible for mainly determining the course of the 
globalisation process. They are seen to assist the developing countries, as they are the driving 
force behind the policy reforms that the developing countries are expected to apply to be 
supported by these two institutions (Bigman, 2000:28). They are also understood to have 
exposed the developing countries to strict policy measures that contributed to the recurrence of 
financial crises in the global economy (Woods, 2006a:374). The lending of the IMF is, in 
addition, observed to keep the developing countries in debt for prolonged periods (Khatkhate, 
2008:37).  
The second view is that these institutions promote the interests of the developed countries. This 
is because the developed countries have the majority of voting rights in these institutions. The 
voting rights in the IMF and the World Bank are based on the global economic importance of 
member countries (Wolff, 2013:84-89).  
Because of the claims regarding the disparities in the role played by these institutions in the 
global economy, this study investigates whether fairly or not these two institutions performed a 
role in responding to the Great Recession2 and the Euro sovereign crisis3. The investigation aims 
not only to describe their respective roles, but also to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
these institutions displayed during these two crisis events.  
1.3 Research objectives 
The primary objective of the study is to determine the role of the IMF and the World Bank in 
responding to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis in a globalised world. To 
achieve this objective, it is necessary to find the facts in respect of the following secondary 
objectives: 
 The different ways in which globalisation is defined and its historical roots. 
 The historical and changing roles, and the criticisms of the two institutions until the Great 
Recession. 
                                                          
2 The Great Recession was a later event that started with the US financial crisis of late 2007. 
3 The Euro sovereign crisis was a later event that started with the Greek fiscal crisis of late 2009. 
 4 
 
 The causes and spread, as well as the impact of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign 
crisis on the global economy. 
 The responses of the IMF and the World Bank to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign 
crisis. 
 The strengths and weaknesses of these institutions as demonstrated by their responses to the 
two international economic crises studied. 
1.4 Research methodology 
The research method undertaken is what Salkind (2000:188) calls a descriptive research of a 
historical nature. This kind of research proceeds through six main steps, namely: 
 A research problem like for any other type of research is identified. 
 A hypothesis is formulated. For a descriptive historical research, the hypothesis is often not 
in the form of one that can be tested statistically, but rather in the form of a question. 
 A variety of documented sources are found and analysed. 
 The evidence obtained from such an analysis is evaluated for authenticity and accuracy. This 
forces the researcher to adopt a critical and evaluative attitude. Through the evaluation of the 
evidence, the answer to the hypothesis is found and the extent of the answer is determined. 
 The documented sources gathered are synthesised, which allows conducting comparative 
analyses in such a way that trends and patterns are identified. 
 The last step involves interpreting the results based on the research objectives and questions 
formulated when the research commenced. 
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1.5 Importance of the study 
The international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have an essential role to play 
in the global economy, similar to that of governments of individual countries (Dutt & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2009:323). This is because, in the currently globalised world, there are risks of a 
crisis spreading to other countries, particularly if there is no rapid intervention (Schmukler et al. 
2003:25; Copelovitch, 2010:1).  
Some authors in this field are of the view that where there is a crisis in a globalised world, 
intervention needs to come from international institutions. For example, regarding the IMF, 
Presbitero and Zazzaro (2012:1945) stated that “the reform of the lending framework has been 
directed at improving the Fund’s capacity to prevent and manage liquidity crises, providing the 
Fund with resources and instruments to credibly play the role of International Lender of Last 
Resort (ILOLR)”. 
A role beyond intervention during times of crises is assigned to these two institutions by authors 
who argue that these institutions ought to provide the optimum framework governing 
globalisation (Liebscher, 2004:2). The governing task is assigned in such a way that 
globalisation’s benefits are internationally endorsed, as these institutions have assisted mainly 
developing countries in adopting trade and investment policies with the aim of facilitating the 
developing countries’ prosperity (Pradhan, 2012:75-76). 
1.6 Scope of the study 
Several studies have been conducted on the role of the IMF and the World Bank. These studies 
have, however, not simultaneously focused on the in-depth response of these institutions to the 
Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. For example, scholars have investigated the 
evolving role of the IMF and the World Bank since their creation, and over the last almost 
quarter of a century, such reviews appeared quite regularly as indicated by the sources named 
(Owen, 1994; Krueger, 1998; Bird, 2007; Rajan, 2008; Reinhart & Trebesch, 2015; Clemens & 
Kremer, 2016; Ravallion, 2016).  
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In the case of the IMF, the focal point of few scholars has been on its role in global financial 
crises (Weiss, 2010; Xafa, 2010; Eichengreen & Woods, 2015), while the focus on the World 
Bank is on its expanded agenda (Vetterlein, 2007; Pereira, 2016). 
In an earlier study, the strengths and weaknesses of the IMF and the World Bank in managing 
the challenges posed by globalisation were assessed. The study was, however, only for the period 
1945-2006 (Thibane & Wait, 2015). A recent survey by Kahler concentrated on the 
effectiveness, legitimacy and adaptability of these institutions. The study highlighted the role of 
these institutions during the Great Recession, but it did not go into depth as far as analysing their 
performance in responding to the recession (Kahler, 2016). 
Given the limitations of previous studies, this study focuses mainly on investigating the role of 
IMF and the World Bank in responding to the challenges of the Great Recession and the Euro 
sovereign crisis. The emphasis of this study is on these two institutions because some of their 
roles and functions, such as their crisis lending are complementary. This has been supported by 
studies which have revealed the response of each of these institutions to earlier crises such as the 
1980s debt crisis (Sanford, 1988:261; Boughton, 2000b; Güven, 2012:873) and the 1990s crises 
(Bordo & James, 2000:33; IEG, 2009a:5; Kabir & Hassan, 2009:409-426). 
The period for this study is from 2007 to 2014. This closing date is based on the time when this 
research was first contemplated. The duration of the study encompasses the Great Recession and 
the Euro sovereign crisis events.  
1.7 Organisation of the study 
 Chapter Two concentrates on the definitions of the globalisation concept and provides a 
summary of the history of globalisation.  
 Chapter Three discusses, respectively, the historical and changing roles, as well as the 
criticisms of the IMF and the World Bank. 
 Chapter Four explains the causes of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. It also 
shows the impact of these crises and how they spread to other countries globally.  
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 Chapter Five analyses the responses of the IMF and the World Bank to the Great Recession 
and the Euro sovereign crisis, as well as the extent to which their strengths and weaknesses 
are revealed. 
 Chapter Six provides conclusions based on the above analysis and indicates areas for future 
research.  
The definitions of globalisation and its history is the topic of the next chapter. 
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2. Chapter Two: Definitions and history of globalisation  
2.1 Introduction  
The IMF and the World Bank fulfil their roles in a globalised world. It is necessary to provide a 
synopsis of how the globalisation concept is defined and to briefly mention the timeline of 
globalisation, as this is the first secondary objective of this study. 
This chapter, firstly, focuses on the definitions of globalisation. Secondly, it presents the origins 
of globalisation and lastly, it provides a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 The definitions of globalisation 
Scholars who seek to understand the evolving global economy regularly use the term 
globalisation. A review of the literature of this concept since the middle 1990s reveals two main 
approaches. The first approach is one that describes the term within a global setting, while the 
second approach narrows the use of the word to what one can equally call regionalisation.  
Some researchers who propound the first approach produce definitions with a wide scope, while 
others who promote the second approach narrow their definitions down to the field of economic 
activities. These economic activities are then of a real, as well as of a financial nature. From the 
real perspective, the international movement of goods and services and of the production factors 
of entrepreneurship and labour are included in the definitions and descriptions. From a financial 
standpoint, the focus is on capital movements, which results in analyses of foreign direct 
investments (FDI). 
The work by Kellner (2002), Al-Rhodan (2006) and the IMF (2008a), follow the route of a wide-
scoped definition of globalisation. 
Kellner wrote about the term ‘globalisation’ to encompass aspects such as capitalist markets, sets 
of social relations, as well as ideologies and cultural models which are transmitted globally 
(Kellner, 2002:287). Al-Rhodan (2006:2) states that “Globalization is a process that 
encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration 
of human and non-human activities”.  
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The IMF casts the net equally wide by writing that globalisation does not only refer to economic 
integration, but there are also cultural, political and environmental aspects attached to it (IMF, 
2008a:2).  
The views expressed by the authors who consider the globalisation concept to be of a wide scope 
are supported by Fischer (2003), as well as Flynn and Giraldez (2008). 
Fischer acknowledges that some of the challenges of globalisation are real and relate to the field 
of economics, while some are concerning the non-economic aspects of life (Fischer, 2003:3). 
Flynn and Giraldez add that the globalisation notion is fundamentally interdisciplinary and that 
the explanations of economic globalisation should merge with the non-economic ones, which are 
widely debated throughout several disciplines (Flynn & Giraldez, 2008:361).    
The literature which belongs to the category in which globalisation is only seen to be narrow in 
respect of economic activities, is to be found in the work by Frankel (2000), Mrak (2000), 
Shangquan (2000), Hay and Marsh (2001), Seliger (2004), Lee and Vivarelli (2006), Aisbett 
(2007), Easterly (2007) and Mills (2009). 
First, globalisation means a process by which different countries of the world become as one 
country (Askari, 2004:57). This is where there is a partial eradication of differences between 
countries, such as separate national currencies and financial regulation systems (Hay & Marsh, 
2001:21). 
Second, globalisation means a promise of participation and wealth in a new global economic 
environment (Seliger, 2004:5).  
Third, the process of globalisation is defined to involve the free movement of the three factors, 
namely FDI, people, goods and services (Easterly, 2007:111).  
Authors such as Frankel (2000), Mrak (2000), Shangquan (2000), Lee and Vivarelli (2006), 
Aisbett (2007), as well as Mills (2009) have defined globalisation beyond the movement of FDI, 
people, goods and services to include technology, transport costs, and internationalisation of 
production and markets. 
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Frankel, Shangquan, Lee and Vivarelli, and Aisbett give the credit of globalisation to the role 
and influence of technological advancements and reduced transport costs (Frankel, 2000:2; 
Shangquan, 2000:1; Lee & Vivarelli, 2006:2; Aisbett, 2007:35).  
Mrak alludes to the internationalisation of production that is associated with the changes in the 
production structure, to be one of the features of globalisation (Mrak, 2000:v).  
Mills states that globalisation means the internationalisation of markets, which include changes 
in laws, institutions, or practices that make various economic transactions easier across national 
borders (Mills, 2009:3). This view sees the role of the state in managing economic activity, to 
have declined under the pressures of globalisation (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996:4). 
This study has further observed the view that merges globalisation with regionalisation. By way 
of example, Trifu regards globalisation and regionalisation to be parallel processes. This is based 
on the explanation that regionalisation is driven by countries who seek alternative trading 
arrangements, because of the fear that the multilateral negotiations may fail globally (Trifu, 
2010:89). 
Some authors argue that often globalisation actually means regionalisation. International trade 
has taken a regional direction in the sense that trade within regions has increased rapidly 
compared to trade between regions (Kapur & Webb, 2007:584). Glenn augments this perspective 
by referring to the fact that the vast bulk of manufacturing and service activities take place 
regionally rather than globally (Glenn, 2007:78).  
In light of the wide scope attached to the globalisation concept, as well as the similar approach 
by the IMF, the analysis of this study in Chapter Five will be conducted with the IMF’s view in 
mind. 
2.3 The origins of globalisation 
The review of literature written on the origins of globalisation reveals that its history originated 
around five central themes, namely the movement of people, international trade, technological 
advancements, commodity price convergence and FDI. 
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2.3.1 Migration (movement of people)  
The first theme on the birth of globalisation refers to the time since homo sapiens started 
moving. According to Chanda (2008:119) “In a longue durée historical perspective, 
globalization has been growing ever since homo sapiens settled into sedentary cultures in river 
valleys”.  
Some authors claim that globalisation started during the 1490s when Columbus and da Gama 
sailed from Europe to other parts of the world. The early 1490s is often mentioned as the 
‘Voyages of Discovery’ by Columbus and da Gama in 1492, which initiated a process that led to 
a significant transfer of technology, plants, animals and diseases that have never been 
experienced before (Lindert & Williamson, 2001:1-2). Dunne supplements that Columbus’ 
discovery exerted an influence which transferred European values to other Western civilisations 
(Dunne, 1999:17). 
Mittelman shares similar sentiments to Lindert and Williamson that globalisation may have 
evolved in the fourteenth century during the origins of civilisation (Mittelman, 2002:18).  
Baldwin showed that since the beginnings of human civilisation, every village had to produce 
what it would consume. This is because the movement of goods, ideas and people involved 
enormous costs. Globalisation is about lowering the costs of moving goods across national 
borders, which would in turn increase international trade (Baldwin, 2014:213). 
Since the sixteenth century, the travelling of people across national borders marked another 
period of globalisation. The Europeans travelled the world before making colonial movements 
into Africa and Asia (Held et al. 1999:484). Grant and Short agree that since the beginnings of 
colonialism, globalisation became increasingly significant (Grant & Short, 2002:9).  
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There is, however, a different view expounded by Flynn and Giraldez, although they do not 
dispute that globalisation became prevalent in the sixteenth century. They refer to the sixteenth 
century as the re-birth rather than the original birth of global human history. They state that 
before the sixteenth century humans had already migrated to most of today’s densely populated 
parts of the world. The ‘de-globalisation’ preceding the sixteenth century can be attributed to 
global warming, which caused oceans to rise and disconnected countries of the world. It was 
only during the sixteenth century that countries of the world were reconnected, via both the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that the globalisation process was resumed (Flynn & Giraldez, 
2008:361-382). 
Since the 1850s, the migration policies in the countries, such as New Zealand, the United States, 
Argentina and Canada were mostly liberal. Between 1850 and 1913, many people from Europe 
migrated to countries in Australia, New Zealand, North and South America. During the inter-war 
period, a tendency developed for countries to limit migration inflows. The migration since the 
1850s can be regarded as the signs of globalisation during that time (WTO, 2008:19).  
After the Second World War, people moved which also indicates globalisation. During 2005, the 
number of international migrants stood at 195 million. This is regarded to be the highest 
achieved in the post-World War Two period of migration compared to the 75 million in 1960 
(Fix et al. 2009:1). The movement of people in the 2000s is stated to have increased considerably 
after the Millennium Development Goals were adopted during the year 2000 (IOM, 2013:38). 
Time will tell whether this is going to be the case under the influence of the seventeen 
Sustainable Development Goals adopted for the period 2016-2030 (UN, 2015:12). 
In assessing the argument that the beginning of migration also marked the beginning of 
globalisation, raises the question of whether the earlier migration is a uniquely western 
phenomenon? In answering this question, Bade refers to the earlier European and non-European 
immigration history. He mentions the time when Africans and Asians, mainly the Arabs and 
Turks, when they expanded into the southern parts of Europe during 600 and 1500, as an 
indication that migration was not unique to Western civilisations (Bade, 2001:9811). 
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2.3.2 International trade 
The second theme around which the history of globalisation is written, is about the growth of 
international trade. Within this broad theme of international trade, there are three separate time 
periods that authors refer to as the start of globalisation. The first period relates to trade 
liberalisation of the 1780s, while the second period is based on the international trade during 
both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The last period focuses on the post-war emergence 
of the globalisation terminology and the expansion of the European global trade.    
Some researchers such as Morrison have observed the first era of trade liberalisation, thus, 
globalisation to have taken place in the 1780s since the so-called ‘American Revolutionary War’. 
This is based on Britain’s pursuance of free trade with other countries. Between 1785 and 1793, 
Britain had approximately ten reciprocal international trade agreements. During the 1780s, 
Britain’s economic policy also shifted from mercantilism to Adam Smith’s laissez-faire 
ideology. The laissez-faire system meant that government control would be reduced and the 
‘invisible hand’ of the market would take over. The ‘invisible hand’ referred to a free market 
where demand and supply of goods and services would automatically augment an economy 
towards market equilibrium (Morrison, 2012:396-407). 
Higgins provides evidence of the growth of international trade between 1870 and 1940, and such 
growth can be regarded as an indicator of globalisation. By way of example, the Indonesian 
growth of exports was ten times greater in the year 1920 than the year 1880. Malaysia also 
witnessed the growth of exports to be nearly fourteen times more in the year 1950 when 
compared to 1906. Other countries like Burma and Thailand, achieved a considerable increase in 
exports between 1870 and 1900 (Higgins, 1959:345-346).  
The link between the economic orientation in the definition of globalisation and its history is 
shown by Temin (1999:76), Scholte (2002:4) and Al-Rodhan (2006:6). They refer to the 
appearance of the globalisation term in the dictionary during the early 1960s.  
The presence of the globalisation term in a dictionary since the 1960s can be ascribed to the 
European expansion and the proliferation of the growth of international trade after the Second 
World War, which exceeded that experienced just before the First World War (WTO, 2008:15).  
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During 1948-1960 the total value of merchandise exports excluding that of communist countries 
increased from $53 billion to $112.3 billion. This increase was at an annual average growth rate 
of approximately 6%, while in the 1960s this number was higher at 8% per annum. In the 1970s 
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the crises that followed, international trade 
increased at a much slower rate (Terborgh, 2003:3). 
The growth of international trade after the Second World War can be attributed to the role of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in liberalising the international trade policies 
of several developed countries. The first five GATT rounds (1947-62), the Kennedy Round 
(1964-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79) produced the weighted tariff reductions by the 
developed countries of approximately 36%, 37% and 33% respectively (Subramanian & Wei, 
2007:153). 
While the term “globalisation” first appeared in the Oxford Dictionary in the 1960s, the terms 
‘globalise’ and ‘globalism’ were coined in the 1940s (Glenn, 2007:1). This shows that 
globalisation related terminology gained acceptance during the 1940s. 
2.3.3 Technological advancements 
The third theme on the origins of globalisation is regarding the impact of technological 
advancements over time. Writers have concentrated mostly on the role of technology in 
introducing new inventions aimed at reducing barriers to the accelerated drive of economic 
activity.  
This section is presented in two parts; first, it focuses on the developments during the British 
Industrial Revolution and second, on the uprising of information technology communications 
(ICTs) in the 1990s. 
The first view is that globalisation became prevalent during the middle of the nineteenth century 
and lasted up to the outbreak of the First World War, particularly during 1870 to 1913 
(Srinivasan, 2002; Jacks et al. 2010:128).  
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Crafts and Venables explained that globalisation is about changing costs of economic 
connections across distance and the impact this has on the geographical distribution of economic 
activity. This came about by the technological advancements resulting from the British Industrial 
Revolution, such as steamships and railroads that contributed significantly to the decline in land 
and ocean transport costs. The decrease in transport costs since the 1870s promoted economic 
relations through the narrowing of international price gaps and increasing migration flows 
(Crafts & Venables, 2003:323-325).  
The technological advancements furthermore transformed the way in which production took 
place during the Industrial Revolution (Hudson, 1992:3). Britain, which comprises of England, 
Scotland, Ireland and Wales, became the first industrial nation in the eighteenth century. Britain 
had several favourable internal conditions, such as affordable energy that aided its development 
(Spear, 2014:85-87). In the case of international trade, it had minimal internal barriers such as 
tariffs and tolls (Mokyr & Nye, 2007:55).  
Figure 2.1 below is presented to show the distribution of the world’s manufacturing production 
between 1830 and 1913. 
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of the world’s manufacturing production 1830-1913 (in %) 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on data by Bairoch & Kozul-Wright (1996:15). 
Figure 2.1 provides evidence that Britain has been a dominant force of industrial development 
since the 1830s. It was not until 1913 that Britain ceased to be an industrial power, as large 
countries such as the United States and Germany took the lead in this regard. For example, in 
1913 the United States, Germany, and France combined, contributed to about over 50% of the 
world’s distributed manufacturing production.  
The globalisation process during the process of industrialisation was halted or nearly arrested by 
two World Wars and the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s (Fischer, 2003:3-4; 
Broadberry & Harrison, 2005:3). 
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The second view is that globalisation became increasingly significant during the 1990s (Seliger, 
2004:5). Since the early 1990s, the ICT revolution has made globalisation possible through the 
rapid spread of vast amounts of information worldwide (Spilerman, 2009:74). Innovations such 
as the advent of the Internet and mobile technology have brought about changes in the way 
people interact, communicate and work. By way of example, the number of the world’s internet 
users and mobile phone subscribers, respectively, increased from 3 million to more than 3 billion 
and from 11 million to more than 6 billion between 1990 and 2014 (Jorgenson & Vu, 2016:383-
384).  
There has also been an upsurge of approximately 7.3% to 28.8% (on a per-capita basis) in the 
number of minutes spent on cross-border telephone calls between the period 1991 and 2006 
(IMF, 2008a:2).  
2.3.4 Commodity price convergence 
The fourth theme on the beginnings of globalisation indicates the global commodity price 
convergence since the 1870s until the First World War. The price convergence was about the 
spread of prices in one market to other markets and the decline in the international price gaps for 
commodities such as rice, cotton, textile, coal, coffee, iron, wool and copper. The price 
convergence was driven by the decline in international transport costs4 of moving commodities 
beginning in 1820, which in turn increased international trade (O’Rourke & Williamson, 
2002:35-39).  
Relating the birth of globalisation to price convergence was heavily criticised. This critique is 
based on the fact that price convergence is not an influential event in the globalisation history. 
The critics argued that it is a later event which took place during the Industrial Revolution that 
led to globalisation. The convergence or divergence was about whether people, products or 
activities that occurred in one country caused permanent and universal effects in other countries 
globally. Where such permanent and universal effects were observed, it was regarded as 
convergence and thus, as signs of globalisation (Flynn & Giraldez, 2008:360-368).   
                                                          
4 The decline in the transport costs was powered by transport innovations. 
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2.3.5 FDI 
The last theme on the roots of globalisation is that it was witnessed during the 1980s (Mills, 
2009:3). The rise of globalisation during the 1980s is explained by the increases in FDI 
movements. For example, the compound yearly growth rate of world FDI outflows was 28.9% 
between 1983 and 1989, when compared to 9.4% of world exports and 7.8% of world GDP 
during the same period (UNCTAD, 1991:3-4).  
The acceleration of FDI growth was a result of the substantial reforms undertaken by several 
countries, such as the OECD countries concerning the governance of FDI in the 1970s and early 
1980s. The developing countries followed suit and started reforms towards the late 1980s and 
1990s, as they came to accept the importance of FDI for their economic development (Thomsen 
& Mistura, 2017). 
This section has shown that the globalisation events are during different periods. The process of 
globalisation is also driven by factors such as migration, international trade, technology, price 
convergence and FDI. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided evidence that there is no universally-accepted definition of the 
globalisation concept. Section 2.2 revealed that while economists have confined the meaning of 
globalisation to the field economics, others have extended its meaning beyond this.  
Section 2.3 indicated the globalisation determined by the movement of people to have occurred 
since the time homo sapiens started moving. The globalisation events other than migration were 
observed during the later periods. 
From this chapter, it is also observed that the definition used for the term globalisation, 
determines the time when the phenomenon originated. To ascertain the actual beginnings of 
globalisation, there has to be a consensus in its definition. 
Given the fact that globalisation became prevalent during different periods as indicated in this 
chapter, the following chapter provides an overview of how the process of globalisation 
coincided with the historical roles of the IMF and the World Bank.  
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3. Chapter Three: The historical and changing roles, and criticisms 
of the IMF and the World Bank 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter Three is aimed at the second secondary objective of the study. Since their inception, the 
IMF and World Bank have constantly evolved as they deal with challenges emanating from 
globalisation events. The way in which these institutions carried out their roles and managed 
crises also gave rise to several criticisms.  
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section explores the mandates and roles of the IMF 
and the World Bank. The second section highlights the criticisms of these institutions, while the 
last section summarises the chapter. 
3.2 The objectives and functions, and related changes over time, of the IMF 
and the World Bank  
3.2.1 The IMF 
The IMF is an international institution consisting of 188 member countries as of 2015. The IMF 
oversees the international monetary system, to ensure that it works efficiently. The primary 
objectives of the IMF are to promote the exchange rate stability, expansion and the balanced 
growth of international trade (IMF, 2015a:4).  
3.2.1.1 The functions of the IMF 
The functions of the IMF are, namely (IMF, 2015a:4): 
i. To provide advice to its member countries regarding the adoption of macroeconomic 
policies, as the basis of alleviating poverty and stimulating economic growth. 
ii. To provide temporary funding to its member countries encountering balance of payments 
difficulties.  
iii. To provide technical assistance and training for countries to be able to build the expertise and 
institutions necessary to implement sound economic policies. 
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3.2.1.2  Origin, growth and contemporary role of the IMF 
The desire by the participants at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 to establish a stable 
exchange rate regime, can be understood against a brief history of the international monetary 
system from circa 1870. The historical and changing role of the IMF is presented in a format not 
yet available in a single research report. This is done through the use of various sources that have 
appeared in the literature between the 1980s and 2017. 
In the 1870s, the international monetary system was based on the Classical Gold Standard. The 
United States officially adopted the Gold Standard in 1879. This led to all major developed 
countries and most developing countries to adopt the Gold Standard, although in different years 
(Mollick, 2016:89-92).  
The Gold Standard law obligated countries’ central banks to preserve the value of the national 
currency with regards to a fixed weight of gold, by buying and selling gold at a fixed price based 
on demand (Newby, 2012:1498).  
The exchange rates were relatively stable amongst countries of the world that adhered to the 
Gold Standard and policy makers praised the operations of the system (Morys, 2013:205). It was 
not until the start of the First World War that major countries suspended their commitment to 
gold convertibility. This resulted in the collapse of the system and floating exchange rate 
arrangements (Dibooglu, 1998:227). 
After the First World War, governments and central bankers were in quest of an international 
monetary system that would bring about exchange rate stability. They desired the prosperity that 
prevailed during the Gold Standard. In April 1925, Britain returned to the Gold Standard and by 
the end of the same year several countries became committed to the gold system. The interwar 
Gold Standard came to be known as the ‘Gold Exchange Standard’, because it operated as an 
exchange system based on key currencies. It functioned well until Britain started experiencing 
continuous balance of payments deficits and suffered from large gold outflows. The Bank of 
England was under pressure to consistently engage in strict monetary policy activities to 
maintain gold convertibility. The adjustment mechanisms of the system were also unable to 
rectify such deficits and its stability was under threat (Wandschneider, 2008:152-156).  
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The Gold Exchange Standard started to collapse when, in September 1931, Britain abandoned it 
and devalued the pound. This led to other countries, which had made the convertibility of their 
currencies reliant on the British pound, abandon the Gold Exchange Standard (Selgin, 2013:14). 
Following the collapse of the Gold Exchange Standard (1925-1931), the members at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944 saw a need for a new set of cooperative monetary arrangements. This 
was because several countries engaged in competitive currency devaluations and adopted 
restrictive economic policies on trade and capital flows (Dominguez, 1993:357-360).  
The IMF with the small membership base of twenty eight countries in 1945 (Reinhart & 
Trebesch, 2015:5), was created to maintain the fixed but adjustable exchange rate system 
(Meltzer, 2007:177). The US Dollar was fixed to gold at $35 per ounce, while the currencies of 
other IMF members were fixed to the Dollar at dissimilar rates (Weiss, 2010:108).  
The IMF played a marginal financing role during approximately the first decade (1945-1955) of 
its operation5 (Bordo & James, 2000:15). According to Truman (2017:8), the “Total IMF 
disbursements from its fiscal year 1948 to fiscal year 1956 were only $1,236 million. 
Repayments were $958 million, and IMF credit outstanding on April 30, 1956, the end of the 
Fund’s fiscal year, was only $72 million”. The United States largely fulfilled the financing role 
through the Marshall Plan Programme. The programme transferred approximately $13 billion to 
Europe during 1948 to 1951 (De Long & Eichengreen, 1991:2).  
By the late 1950s, the IMF led to the achievement of full currency convertibility6 by numerous 
countries. The Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system worked as predicted from 1959-1968 
under full currency convertibility (Garber, 1993:461). This era of full currency convertibility is 
regarded to be a period of prosperity, which was associated with sustained economic growth and 
liberalisation of international trade. The IMF further seemed to be carrying out its mandate 
smoothly (Bird, 2007:686). 
 
                                                          
5 The IMF started operating in 1945. 
6 The ease that one currency can be converted to another currency and can be used for settlements of international 
financial transactions. 
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The delegates at the Bretton Woods Conference that created the IMF, had envisaged the 
operation of the fixed exchange rate system in presence of limited global capital flows 
(Eichengreen, 1993b:623). In the late 1960s, global capital flows expanded, which led to the 
unsustainability of the Bretton Woods system (Obstfeld & Taylor, 2003:125). The expansion of 
capital flows presented another challenge of spill-over effects that the IMF didn’t have to deal 
with during its early years (Rajan, 2008:113-114). 
During the 1960s, the UK, which was the issuer of the world's second most valuable reserve 
currency, also experienced a persistent balance of payments deficit (Bordo & James, 2000:16). 
The Bretton Woods system became under severe strain, as the US encountered balance of 
payments deficit and a decline in gold reserves. Inevitably, the system collapsed during the early 
1970s (Fukumoto, 2011:852-853).  
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the developed countries adopted floating 
exchange rates, although many countries still decided to keep their exchange rates fixed mainly 
to the US Dollar (Meltzer, 2007:178).  
The IMF’s role changed after several developed countries adopted floating exchange 
arrangements, as it was originally created to manage the fixed exchange rate system. In addition, 
the countries with floating exchange rates, which were mainly the developed countries, no longer 
had to be concerned with having enough reserves and to borrow from the IMF in times of 
financial need (Khatkhate, 2008:33). This was because of the expansion of capital markets that 
provided such funds (Bordo & James, 2000:16). For example, the last IMF programmes to the 
developed countries before the Great Recession, were in Italy and the UK in 1977 (Yoon, 
2005:183). 
The current account deficits were also no longer a problem for the developed countries in the 
1970s, as in 1970 the G-77 countries recorded very small current account surpluses of less than 
$3 billion (Boughton, 2000a:282).  
 
                                                          
7 The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 
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Beginning in the 1980s, the IMF’s membership expanded to include the developing countries, as 
of 30 April 1980 the IMF’s members had risen to one hundred and forty (IMF, 1980:83). From 
this period, the IMF increased its involvement in the developing countries. By way of example, 
during the 1980s-debt crisis and 1990s crises, the IMF lent to the developing countries that were 
most affected by these crises. This was because the banking and debt crises tended to have a 
longer lasting impact on countries compared to the previous currency crises that the IMF had to 
deal with. The IMF became more dedicated to long-term assistance, rather than its original 
mission of temporary assistance (Reinhart & Trebesch, 2015:3).  
After the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the IMF started to champion the cause of 
financial liberalisation. It shifted focus to promoting the free international flow of capital, as it 
embraced the removal of existing controls, and restrictions on exchange and financial operations. 
Due to the contagion effect of an economic crisis, the IMF has since the 1990s also increased its 
involvement in the management of capital account liberalisation (Yoon, 2005:184-185).  
In summary, the IMF’s role changed after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 
1970s. The IMF’s involvement in the global economy has swung between the developed and 
developing countries. During the Bretton Woods system, the IMF focused on the developed 
world and from approximately the 1980s on the developing world. 
3.2.2 The World Bank 
The World Bank is an international institution comprising of 188 member countries as of 2015. 
Its main objective is directed at reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development. The 
World Bank Group has five institutions playing different roles, namely the World Bank in the 
form of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA)8. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) form part of the World Bank group (World Bank, 2015:7-9). 
                                                          
8 The IBRD and the IDA share similar staff and headquarters.  
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3.2.2.1 The functions of the World Bank Group 
The functions of the World Bank Group, are namely (World Bank, 2015:7): 
i. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
 To lend to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries. 
ii. International Development Association 
 To provide interest-free loans, or credits and grants to governments of the developing 
countries. 
iii. International Finance Corporation 
 To provide loans, equity and advisory services to stimulate private sector investment in 
the developing countries. 
iv. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
 To provide political risk insurance and credit enhancement to investors and lenders to 
facilitate foreign direct investment in the emerging market economies. 
v. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
 To provide international facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. 
3.2.2.2 Origin, growth and contemporary role of the World Bank 
Similar to the IMF, the evolving role of the World Bank since its creation is outlined in the 
manner that has not been a focal point of several independent research reports. 
After the Second World War, private capital flows were limited (Rajan, 2008:110). The private 
capital markets were still underdeveloped and most governments other than the US could not 
provide capital (Owen, 1994:98). For example, the global stock of international investments 
measured by the value of assets in 1945 was 5% of world GDP (Ravallion, 2016:78).  
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The World Bank with the initial membership of twenty eight countries on 27 December 1945 
(World Bank, 2001a), was established to play a major role in providing funds to the liquidity 
constrained global economy and reconstruction after the Second World War (Gilbert et al. 
1999:601; Weaver & Park, 2007:461). The architects of the World Bank believed that it would 
provide temporary financing for countries to grow enough until they were able to borrow 
commercially (Clemens & Kremer, 2016:53).  
The World Bank played a marginal role during the early years of its operation. It provided small 
amounts of capital in the form of loans to the European countries to rebuild infrastructure that 
was destroyed during the war (Goldman, 2007:13). The US government provided the bulk of 
post-war reconstruction capital to Europe through the Marshall Plan (Broad, 2006:390; Woods, 
2006b:43; Sharma, 2013:668). Challenges facing developing countries, such as poverty did not 
form part of the World Bank’s agenda in those early years (Peet, 2009:127). 
To be able to work towards the objective of this research, it is necessary to give a brief review of 
the establishment of the institutions within the World Bank Group listed above in section 3.2.2.1. 
Since the creation of the World Bank, its Articles of Agreement prevented it from providing 
loans to the private sector without any government guarantees (Owen, 1994:99). There were 
concerns from member country governments that the private sector was not being effectively 
assisted by multilateral lending institutions in their current form. To address these concerns, the 
IFC was established in the mid-1950s, which is often referred to as the private sector arm of the 
World Bank Group (Mundy & Menashy, 2014:17).  
In the beginning of the 1960s, the World Bank Group expanded again to create the IDA 
(Sanford, 1997:297), as a response to the struggle that some of the World Bank’s borrowers, 
especially the developing countries in Africa and Asia experienced in repaying their loans 
(Owen, 1994:98). The IDA provides grants and interest-free loans on concessional terms to the 
developing countries with per capita income below $1 215 per year. Domestic currencies are 
converted to the US Dollar at market exchange rates (Clemens & Kremer, 2016:54-55).  
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During the mid-1960s another World Bank Group institution known as the ICSID was created. 
The establishment of the ICSID was necessitated by the need to encourage international 
investment to the developing countries, especially in the form of FDI. This was because of the 
benefits FDI brings such as employment, infrastructure, technology and skills transfer. The 
ICSID’s role is additionally to resolve any disputes related to FDI that may arise (Bashmill, 
2016:2-4).  
The 1980s period not only witnessed the creation of another new World Bank Group institution, 
but also a shift in the World Bank’s role. MIGA was established in 1988 to provide insurance 
against political risks (Eichengreen et al. 1993a:594). During the 1980s, the World Bank became 
involved in assisting the developing countries regarding lending and policy advice following the 
1980s-debt crisis. The World Bank expanded its activities beyond project lending to include 
adjustment loans (Sanford, 1988:261-262; Jayarajah & Branson, 1995:108; De Janvry & Dethier, 
2012:11). This was because many developing countries participated in the global economy 
which exposed them to the international economic shocks. The developing countries became 
more dependent on trade and finance as the basis for their economic prosperity (Kahler, 2016:2).  
In the 1990s, the World Bank focused on social policies in steering economic growth as the 
means to reduce poverty (Vetterlein, 2007:513). To get access to the World Bank’s funds in the 
1990s required countries to follow privatisation policies as a precondition (Goldman, 2007:17). 
This conditionality complemented the Washington Consensus of the 1980s. The Washington 
Consensus was explained to be an appropriate policy for debtor countries to overcome their debt 
problems. It was focussed on the ‘neoliberalism policies’ such as trade and inward FDI 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation (Williamson, 2004:1-3).  
The introduction of the Washington Consensus was a significant shift within the World Bank, as 
Keynesianism dominated the ideas in the World Bank during its initial years. This is because one 
of the architects of the World Bank included John Maynard Keynes, who is the founder of the 
Keynesian school of thought. At that time, the World Bank’s thinking did not support trade 
liberalisation and export-orientation (Broad, 2006:390-391). Keynesianism was in favour of 
government intervention in a world where there are market imperfections (Steil, 2013:1).  
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During the late 1990s, East Asia experienced a financial crisis (1997-98), which was associated 
with plummeting stock markets and depreciating Asian currencies (Valvi et al. 2012:5-6). 
Following the Asian crisis, there were proposals regarding the regulation of financial 
transactions. It was not until April 1998 when the World Bank’s president, Wolfensohn, declared 
an end to the Washington Consensus. Subsequently, a new agenda for the World Bank focused 
on the promotion of social issues, such as basic education and primary healthcare (Pereira, 
2016:827).  
In summary, the World Bank’s role shifted since it was first established. Similar to the IMF, 
during its first few decades, the World Bank focused on the developed countries such as Europe 
and later following the 1980s debt crisis, it shifted attention to the problems of the developing 
countries.  
3.3 The criticisms of the IMF and the World Bank 
There are numerous criticisms of the IMF and the World Bank, which relate to them fulfilling 
their roles and how they dealt with the past global financial crises. The study focuses on the 
criticisms of the two institutions which appeared in the literature leading up to the Great 
Recession. 
This section is divided into two parts. It starts by focusing on the criticisms that apply to the two 
institutions and lastly on the criticisms which deviate from the joint approach and apply to only 
one institution. 
The points of criticisms that can be considered jointly are, firstly, the criticisms on the 
performance of these institutions in achieving their mandates. Secondly, the criticisms based on 
their policy advice in resolving crises and conditions attached to their lending. Lastly, the 
criticisms of these two institutions pertaining to their declining lending role.  
The first main critique of these two institutions has been their ineffectiveness in achieving their 
mandates, especially since the 1970s. 
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Critics argue that the IMF does not have the expertise to deal with developmental issues and 
should focus on problems of global financial stability, which it has failed to address in the past 
(Stiglitz & Tsuda, 2007:84). This is because after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system 
in the early 1970s, the IMF was engaged in developmental issues. This made it similar to the 
World Bank as it shifted its focus to poverty reduction and promoting growth (Milner, 
2005:836). 
In the case of the World Bank, since McNamara left the Presidential office of the World Bank in 
1981, there has been a discussion on whether it has focused more on structural adjustment 
policies at the expense of poverty reduction (Sanford, 1989:151). During McNamara’s term, he 
supported a broader notion of development which emphasised the issue of poverty reduction 
(Woods, 2006b:45).  
Meltzer adds that the World Bank is ineffective in performing the role of poverty reduction, as 
this has led to the IMF to be involved in poverty reduction, through its Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) lending (Meltzer, 2007:179). Askari, however, expounds that for the 
World Bank and the IMF to be successful in implementing their changing roles since their origin, 
they must work together (Askari, 2004:59). 
The second criticism of these institutions is on their conditional lending and policy prescriptions 
to some of the past crises.  
The IMF has been accused of exacerbating a crisis by advising countries to adopt strict economic 
policies in exchange for its financial support (Krueger, 1998:1989; Weithöner, 2006:1258). It has 
also been blamed for not putting too much attention on the poverty effects of its stabilisation 
policies (Woods, 2006a:374).  
Studies researching the 1990s financial crises such as Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, explain 
how the IMF requires countries to implement economic policy changes that may harm growth in 
exchange for financial support (Radelet & Sachs, 1998:12; Corsetti et al. 1999:356-359). 
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The World Bank has faced a similar critique to the IMF regarding the impact of its policy 
lending during past crises. In the past, the World Bank’s loans and credits have primarily been 
for specific projects, but the World Bank’s role has since around the 1980s expanded to include 
adjustment loans. Critics argue that the World Bank does not have sufficient experience of 
adjustment loans (Bajpai, 1990:791).  
A study by Easterly showed that there is little evidence on the positive effects of the adjustment 
lending programmes. The adjustment lending could have an adverse impact on the poor in the 
short-term, but assist them in the long-term by increasing growth (Easterly, 2003:378). The 
short-term adjustment suffering by the poor can mean up to thirty years, which is quite 
significant if one were to scrutinise it (Abbasi, 1999:1004). Sanford explains that the poor would 
even be hurt more in the long-term, by stagnation and misallocation of resources. This may take 
place when a country has unsound economic policies (Sanford, 1988:269).  
The third criticism which opponents of the IMF and the World Bank raise is that there is a 
declining demand for their financial assistance.  
The diminishing lending role of the IMF is owed to the decline in the demand for its resources, 
as capital inflows to individual countries have increased considerably (Hormats, 1998:37; 
Goldman, 2007:20). Critics argue that the role of the IMF was limited even before the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, as the IMF was mainly supposed to deal with the 
global economic relationships between the developed countries (Eichengreen et al. 1993a:593). 
Several countries have started building international reserves and reforming their economic 
policies to prevent a crisis from taking place. Such initiatives show that countries are making 
efforts to avoid the IMF’s assistance as a lender of last resort (Kapur & Webb, 2007:581). In this 
regard, Meltzer has supported the reduction of the IMF in size, because of its limited mandate 
(Meltzer, 2007:178-180).  
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Regarding the World Bank, there has been a perspective that its lending role is also weakening. 
This is because of wider access to international capital markets by those countries that would 
normally have approached the World Bank for assistance (Krueger, 1998:1992; Weaver & Park, 
2007:462). However, Owen maintains that the rationale for the World Bank has been that it 
would take a long time before private capital markets could finance the programmes that the 
World Bank currently sponsors (Owen, 1994:106).  
There are two specific points of criticisms which apply to the one institution and not to the other.  
First, in the context of the IMF, the focal point has been on its crisis prevention efforts. The crisis 
prevention efforts of the IMF have been its weakness, particularly during the 1990s (Ostry & 
Zettelmeyer, 2005:5). This can be based on the IMF’s failure to detect the possibility of a crisis 
occurring, by using its surveillance tools effectively (Malliaris, 2002:78). 
Second, the World Bank’s critics have positioned their attention on its complex mandate as an 
institution (Gilbert et al. 1999:599). This critique is centred on the World Bank’s projects that 
involve a considerable number of goals, which are extended over several countries globally 
(Mallaby, 2005:75). 
In summary, these institutions have undeniably performed their roles in the face of criticisms and 
weaknesses. The criticisms mentioned against these institutions have not been to abolish them, as 
they have related to reforming these institutions or reducing them in size. This seems to suggest 
that these institutions still have a role to play in the global economy. 
3.4 Summary 
Section 3.2 revealed that the IMF and the World Bank were created in the 1940’s to manage the 
global economy. Each institution had a specific mandate. On the one hand, the historical role of 
the IMF was to reconstruct the international monetary system after the Second World War. On 
the other hand, the World Bank was aimed at post-war reconstruction of Europe and to provide 
funding to countries after the war. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the roles of the two 
institutions were reformed, as the growth in private capital flows changed the global economic 
landscape.  
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The IMF’s role changed following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, 
as it was originally setup to manage it. During this period the developed countries withdrew from 
the IMF with regards to requesting financial assistance. The IMF became more involved with the 
developing countries since the 1980s crisis. In the 1990s, the IMF’s role extended to the 
promotion of free movement of capital. 
The World Bank’s role started evolving since the 1980s, following the debt crisis. It started 
lending to the developing countries affected by the crisis. In the 1990s, the World Bank shifted 
its focus to social policies that promote growth. It also expanded its role to include programmes 
on education and healthcare.  
Section 3.3 provided evidence of the criticisms which have been similar and those that have 
deviated from the two institutions. The IMF and the World Bank’s analogous criticisms related 
to their incapability to achieve their mandates. The inadequate policy prescriptions and effects of 
their policy lending have been highlighted as their critique. The growing irrelevance of both 
these institutions in providing finance is regarded to be a result of the expansion of private 
capital markets.  
The specific criticism of each of the two institutions has been that the IMF is ineffective in 
preventing crises. The World Bank has been accused of its goal congestion, as it has evolved to 
include more institutions with complex goals.  
The next chapter focuses on the global impact of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign 
crisis. 
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4. Chapter Four: A review of the causes, spread and impact of the 
Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis 
4.1  Introduction  
To analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the IMF and the World Bank in responding to the 
Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis in the next chapter, it is necessary to provide a 
background on the beginnings of these crises. This will highlight the effect of these crisis events 
in the global economy and the role these two institutions had to play in mitigating the adverse 
effects of the crises. This chapter addresses the third secondary objective of this research report.  
The chapter firstly provides a synopsis of the causes and spread of the Great Recession and the 
Euro sovereign crisis. Secondly, an analysis of the impact of these two crises globally is 
presented. Lastly, it provides the summary of the chapter. 
4.2  The causes and spread of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign 
crisis 
4.2.1 The Great Recession 
The OECD9 countries enjoyed a period of decreasing volatility in the macroeconomic variables 
such as output and inflation during the 1980s (Giannone et al. 2008:5). From the mid-1980s, it 
was also a period of economic stability in the US, as reflected by a substantial decline in 
economic volatility in the US compared to what it experienced during the 1970s (Bullard & 
Singh, 2012:375). 
The US economy continued to grow at a steady pace up until the mid-2000s. This economic 
growth was fuelled by the continuous expansion of credit and low levels of interest rates, which 
powered consumer expenditure (Peicuti, 2014:57).  
 
 
                                                          
9 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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The period of declining economic fluctuations and macroeconomic stability in the US is known 
as the Great Moderation (Pancrazi, 2015:208). The Great Moderation period lasted until about 
2007 (Bezemer & Grydaki, 2014:169). By late 2007, the US started encountering a contraction 
in wealth, an increase in risk spreads, as well as the weakening in the operation of the credit 
market. This was the beginning of what many did not predict to become a US financial crisis. 
The crisis started in the US housing market associated with declining housing prices, which led 
less creditworthy borrowers to default on their loans. This was brought about by sub-prime 
mortgage lending from financial institutions and the housing bubble10 (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2008:340).  
Authors such as Eichler add that the cause of the US financial crisis is because the US banking 
sector was not well regulated at the time leading up to the crisis (Eichler, 2012:1215). Critics 
refer to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in 1991 to have relaxed the US banking 
sector regulation. The Act regulated the US banking sector by restricting the private sector banks 
from functioning as both commercial and investment banks (Lloyd’s, 2010:17-20).  
In a globalised world, there is a risk of a crisis experienced by one country to affect other 
countries. This takes place when countries of the world are financially and trade linked 
(Schmukler et al. 2003:25; Copelovitch, 2010:1). Shahrokhi explains how the US financial crisis 
spread to other countries globally. “The U.S. housing bubble, which peaked in 2007, caused the 
values of securities tied to U.S. real estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions 
worldwide. Economies worldwide slowed as credit tightened and international trade declined. 
Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy 
expansion and institutional bailouts” (Shahrokhi, 2011:194). 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The housing bubble was the increase in the housing prices followed by a sharp decline. 
 34 
 
African countries such as South Africa were not severely affected by the US financial crisis 
through the financial sector. The South African financial institutions were protected against the 
foreign assets risks spreads that were seen in several countries around the world. This was 
because the South African financial institutions are well-regulated, as they adhere to the Basel 
set of standards. The implementation of Basel II in 2008 has been vital in improving the 
management and prevention of a risk caused by a crisis in other countries11 (SA National 
Treasury, 2011:13-14).  
The Basel standards come from an international institution named the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) which has its origins in 1930. The original role of the BIS was to endorse 
central bank cooperation and to ensure that there was a smooth flow of international financial 
settlements globally (Auboin, 1955:1-2). Unlike the focus of the IMF, which is investigated in 
this study mostly on countries’ governments and central banks, the BIS has a financial stability 
mandate mainly focused on international private sector banks (Lloyd’s, 2010:17).  
The BIS started focusing more on international private sector banks since the late 1980s. For 
example, beginning in 1988, the BIS introduced capital standards for international banks, Basel 
I. These standards aimed to ensure standardisation of the banking regulation and supervision 
globally (Ozgercin, 2012:98). In 2004, the BIS further released updated international banking 
standards, Basel II. These standards that were due to be implemented starting from the end of 
2006, were designed for the purposes of improving credit risk management. Basel III was 
released in December 2010 and was to be implemented in phases starting from 1 January 2013. 
The introduction of Basel III had come with international bank capital requirements levels, 
which were higher than those set out in the previous Basel standards. The Basel III standards 
were following the lessons learnt from the US sub-prime financial crisis (BIS, 2014). 
 
                                                          
11 The success with which the South African financial system was shielded from the global recession, was later 
further strengthened by the adoption of the Twin Peaks model. The Twin Peaks model meant the creation of two 
regulators, namely a prudential and market conduct regulator. The prudential regulator is based at the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) and the Financial Services Board (FSB) is a market conduct regulator (FSB, 2014:13). This 
is following the promulgation of the Financial Sector Regulation Bill on 21 August 2017 that is now referred to as 
the Financial Sector Regulation (FSR) Act, 9 of 2017 (SA National Treasury, 2017). 
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Quite a few US private sector banks failed during the recession even in the availability of the 
international banking standards from the BIS. For example, the US financial crisis intensified 
following the insolvency of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in September 2008 and other 
financial institutions12in the US (Xafa, 2010:475; Gnath et al. 2012:5). Other financial 
institutions globally that had securities such as stocks and bonds linked to the US real estate 
prices, collapsed following the housing bubble as previously mentioned (Shahrokhi, 2011:194). 
It was only from late 2007 during the beginnings of the US financial crisis that the US federal 
banking agencies started to implement the Basel II final regulation to banks. The regulation was 
only fully implemented from 1 April 2008. The Basel II standards were also applied to mostly 
the larger US private sector banks which have operations internationally by federal banking 
agencies. Other US banks were only required to meet the Basel I standards and could upgrade to 
Basel II standards by choice. The requirement for the application of Basel standards by banks in 
the US is different to other regions such as Europe. For example, the European Union (EU) had 
authorised the implementation of the Basel II standards to all EU banks in 2005, of which a 
formal agreement was reached by 2006. This was done even though the BIS Basel standards are 
aimed at private sector banks with an international footprint (European Parliament, 2011:8-10).  
The US sub-prime financial crisis later came to be known as the Great Recession because the 
crisis had spread worldwide. It is regarded as the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s (Steil, 2013:1). 
The impact of the financial crisis on the global economies on indicators such as merchandise 
trade, FDI and GDP will be discussed later in the chapter. 
4.2.2 The Euro sovereign crisis 
Baldwin and Gros (2015:2) stated that during the early stages of the Euro Zone (EZ), the “Big 
capital flows from EZ core nations like Germany, France and the Netherlands to EZ periphery 
nations like Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece were taken as evidence that the euro was 
fostering real convergence between a slow-growing core and more dynamic periphery 
economies”.  
                                                          
12 For example, Bear Sterns and AIG.  
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During the beginning of 2009, the EU celebrated a successful decade since the establishment of 
the Euro common market (Bris et al. 2014:554). The celebrations were short-lived, as the newly 
elected Greek government announced during late 2009 that the Greek fiscal deficit was more 
significant than previously estimated. Greece had also exceeded the Stability and Growth Pact 
regulations for the Euro Zone countries (Copelovitch et al. 2016:814).  
The Stability and Growth Pact regulations stipulate that a country’s fiscal deficit may not exceed 
3% of GDP (Moisescu-Duican & Giurescu, 2016:196). In 2009, the EU estimated that the Greek 
general fiscal deficit was 13.6% of GDP (EU, 2010:6). 
The Greek fiscal balance problems resulted in an unexpected weakening in investor confidence 
(Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2016:133) and decline in capital inflows (Unger, 2017:435). By 
2011 and 2012, several EZ countries had repeatedly exceeded boundaries set on the EZ fiscal 
deficits. These countries included France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
(Selvaraj, 2015:7; Jäger & Grigoriadis, 2017:23). The fiscal deficit problems in EZ came to be 
known as the Euro sovereign crisis.  
This study has also observed a different point of view on the first signs of the Euro sovereign 
crisis. The early signs of the Euro Zone crisis are stated to have appeared in Ireland as early as 
September 2008. This is explained against the background of the insolvency of major US 
investment banks such as Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers. The bailout of Bear Sterns in March 
2008 indicated to the market that governments globally were to assist insolvent domestic banks 
financially. Beginning in September 2008, when Lehman Brothers became insolvent, Ireland 
started to experience banking and fiscal deficit problems (IEO, 2016:9). This is because of 
financial globalisation where financial institutions globally, including the Euro Zone, had been 
exposed to the toxic US financial assets during the housing bubble (Shahrokhi, 2011:194). 
Governments’ fiscal deficits increased, as the bank rescue programmes required large sums of 
money (Eichler, 2012:1215). 
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The Euro crisis spread to several countries that were mostly interconnected to the Euro Zone 
through international trade. The UK and the US, which are significant traders of the Euro Zone 
countries, were also affected by the crisis. During mid-2011, the UK exports to the EU had 
declined by about 5% as a result of the crisis. The US exports to the EU countries like Greece, 
Italy and Spain had also fallen since 2010 (Selvaraj, 2015:10-13). 
The impact of the Euro sovereign crisis on the global economy will be assessed in more detail 
below.  
4.3  The impact of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis on the 
global macro-economy  
This section now concentrates on the effects of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis 
on three global macroeconomic indicators, namely world merchandise trade, world FDI and 
world GDP. 
4.3.1 World merchandise trade 
The trend of world merchandise trade is analysed by the use of two figures. First, Figure 4.1 
shows the annual percentage change of the world merchandise trade (exports and imports) during 
the pre-crisis period of 2006-07 and beyond until 2014 in real terms. Second, Figure 4.2 
illustrates the annual percentage change of the world merchandise exports by region during the 
pre-crisis period of 2006-07 and beyond until 2014 in real terms. The year 2007 is included in 
the pre-crisis period throughout this research report because the US financial crisis started in late 
2007. 
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Figure 4.1 World merchandise trade 2006-2014 (annual % change in real terms)13 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on WTO World Trade Reports (WTO, 2008:4; WTO, 2009:6; 
WTO, 2010:24; WTO, 2011:22; WTO, 2012:20; WTO, 2013:24; WTO, 2014:23; WTO, 2015:24). 
According to Figure 4.1, in 2008 world merchandise exports and imports grew at a slower rate of 
2% compared to the average pre-crisis period of 2006-07. During the pre-crisis period of 2006-
07, the growth of world merchandise exports and imports, respectively, was at an average of 7% 
and 6.75%. The world trade situation worsened in 2009, as the growth of world merchandise 
exports and imports reached negative levels of 12.2% and 12.9% respectively.  
                                                          
13 The pre-crisis average is calculated based on data obtained from the 2008 WTO World Trade Report. 
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In 2010, the global economy was recovering from the recession, as the growth in world 
merchandise trade (exports and imports) figures reached positive levels as illustrated in Figure 
4.1. Despite the recovery in 2010, world merchandise exports and imports rose at a sluggish rate 
again in 2011, which was during the early stages of the Euro sovereign crisis. For example, the 
growth of world merchandise exports fell from 14.5% in 2010 to 5% in 2011, while the growth 
of world merchandise imports also decreased from 13.5% in 2010 to 4.9% in 2011.  
During the years 2012-14, the growth of world merchandise exports and imports averaged 1.9% 
and 1.6% respectively. 
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Figure 4.2 World merchandise exports by region 2006-2014 (annual % change in real terms)14 15 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on WTO World Trade Reports (WTO, 2008:4; WTO, 2009:6; WTO, 2010:24; WTO, 2011:22; WTO, 
2012:20; WTO, 2013:24; WTO, 2014:23; WTO, 2015:24).
                                                          
14 It should be noted that the Africa and Middle East percentage changes in Figure 4.2 are measured by averages, as in some of the WTO World Trade Reports 
their data is disaggregated. 
15 The pre-crisis average is calculated based on data obtained from the 2008 WTO World Trade Report. 
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North America 7% 1,5% -14,4% 15% 6,2% 4,5% 2,8% 3%
South and Central America 4,5% 1,5% -5,7% 6,2% 5,3% 1,4% 1,4% -6%
Europe 5,5% 0,5% -14,4% 10,8% 5% 0,6% 1,5% 1%
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 6% 6% -9,5% 10,1% 1,8% 1,6% 0,8% -6%
Africa and Middle East 1% 3% -5,25% 8% -1,45% 3,65% -0,25% -6%
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Figure 4.2 demonstrates the annual percentage changes in world merchandise exports by region. 
In the 2009 period, during the recession, regions such as Europe, Asia and North America 
experienced negative annual percentage changes in merchandise exports of over 10%. For 
example, the annual growth in merchandise exports for Europe, Asia and North America were -
14.4%, -11.1% and -14.4% respectively. Other regions such as South and Central America, the 
CIS, Africa and the Middle East also achieved negative yearly growth in world merchandise 
exports of 5.7%, 9.5% and 5.25%, respectively, during 2009.  
In addition to the declines in the growth of merchandise exports in 2009 according to Figure 4.2, 
the emerging and developing countries were affected by the recession through the declining 
workers’ remittances (Dullien et al. 2010:1).  
In 2011, as the Euro Zone countries experienced a sovereign crisis, five regions16 of the world 
experienced a slower positive growth of merchandise exports compared to 2010. It is only Africa 
and the Middle East combined that recorded a negative growth of merchandise exports of 1.45% 
as per Figure 4.2 
4.3.2 World FDI 
The trend of FDI is analysed by the use of Figure 4.3. It shows the world FDI inflows and 
outflows at nominal prices in ($ billions) during the pre-crisis period of 2005-07 and beyond 
until 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Europe, Asia and North America, South and Central America and the CIS. 
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Figure 4.3 World FDI flows at nominal prices 2005-2014 (in billion $)17 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on various UNCTAD World Investment Reports (UNCTAD, 
2011:24; UNCTAD, 2012:24; UNCTAD, 2013:xvi; UNCTAD, 2014:xviii; UNCTAD, 2015:18).  
According to Figure 4.3, world FDI flows have fluctuated from the pre-crisis period to the year 
2014. During 2008, there was an increase in world FDI inflows to $1 744 billion from the 
average pre-crisis (2005-07) level of $1 472 billion. This was also the case for the world FDI 
outflows as they increased from $1 487 billion to $1 911 billion during the same period. It was 
not until 2009 as the recession engulfed the global economy that world FDI inflows and outflows 
plunged to $1 185 billion and $1 171 billion respectively.  
                                                          
17 It should be noted that the data for 2005-2010 was obtained from the 2011 UNCTAD’s World Investment Report. 
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Domit and Shakir attribute the decline in world investment as a share of GDP during 2009 to the 
fall in demand for and trade of manufactured goods and machinery. This is mainly because 
manufactured goods and machinery represent a significant portion of investment expenditure 
(Domit & Shakir, 2010:187).  
Figure 4.3 also illustrates that world FDI flows reached their lowest levels in 2009 when 
compared to the performance of the pre-crisis period of 2005-07 and beyond until 2014. During 
2010 and 2011, world FDI flows continued to rise as most countries were recovering from the 
recession.  
In 2012, during the Euro sovereign crisis period, world FDI flows decreased when compared to 
the previous year as revealed by Figure 4.3. World FDI inflows plunged to $ 1 351 billion in 
2012 from $1 524 billion in 2011. World FDI outflows also dropped to $1 391 billion in 2012 
from $1 694 billion in 2011. These levels were still below the pre-crisis average and 2008 levels. 
4.3.3 World GDP 
This section illustrates the impact that the Great Recession and Euro Crisis had on world GDP 
through two figures. First, Figure 4.4 shows the annual percentage changes of world GDP during 
2006 until 2014 in real terms. Second, Figure 4.5 indicates the annual percentage changes of 
world GDP by region from 2006 to 2014 in real terms. 
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Figure 4.4 World GDP 2006-2014 (annual % change in real terms) 18 19 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on WTO World Trade Reports (WTO, 2008:4; WTO, 2009:6; 
WTO, 2010:24; WTO, 2011:22; WTO, 2012:20; WTO, 2013:24; WTO, 2014:23; WTO, 2015:21).  
Figure 4.4 demonstrates that in 2008 the growth of world GDP was lower than the pre-crisis 
period of 2006-07. During the pre-crisis period, the average growth rate of world GDP was 
3.55%, while in 2008 it is 1.7%. During the recession in 2009, the world GDP growth reached a 
negative level of 2.3%.  
In 2011, during the Euro sovereign crisis period, it is evident from Figure 4.4 that there was a 
decrease in the world GDP growth from 2010. This was also the case in 2012 as the world GDP 
grew at a sluggish rate of 2.1% when matched to 2.4% in 2011.  
                                                          
18 It should be noted that the Africa and Middle East percentage changes in Figure 4.4 are measured by averages, as 
in some of the WTO World Trade Reports their data is disaggregated. 
19 The pre-crisis average is calculated based on data obtained from the 2008 WTO World Trade Report. 
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Figure 4.5 World GDP by region 2006-2014 (annual % change in real terms) 20 21 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on WTO World Trade Reports (WTO, 2008:4; WTO, 2009:6; WTO, 2010:24; WTO, 2011:22; WTO, 
2012:20; WTO, 2013:24; WTO, 2014:23; WTO, 2015:21).  
                                                          
20 It should be noted that the Africa and Middle East percentage changes in Figure 4.5 are measured by averages, as in some of the WTO World Trade Reports 
their data is disaggregated. 
21 The pre-crisis average is calculated based on data obtained from the 2008 WTO World Trade Report. 
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Figure 4.5 displays that during the two crisis events investigated in this study, regions of the 
world were affected differently. In 2008, as the US financial crisis intensified, Europe, North 
America and Asia, respectively, recorded the lowest annual GDP growth of 1%, 1.1% and 2%. 
Other regions such as South and Central America, the CIS, as well as Africa and the Middle East 
achieved annual GDP growth of above 5%. In 2009, as the financial crisis became a global 
recession, four regions, namely the CIS, Europe, North America, and South and Central America 
were most affected as their yearly GDP growth reached negative levels. Africa and the Middle 
East, as well as Asia still maintained positive annual GDP growth rate of 1.3% and 0.1%, 
respectively, in 2009. 
During 2011, the annual GDP growth rate of all the regions, except for the CIS, had declined 
from 2010. In 2012, it was only the European region which had achieved a negative annual GDP 
growth rate of 0.1%. This might have been triggered by several Euro Zone countries which were 
encountering a sovereign crisis. 
4.4 Summary  
This chapter has provided a brief background on the causes, spread and impact of the Great 
Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis on the global economy.  
Section 4.2 explained the causes of the two crises. The Great Recession started with the US 
financial crisis. The US financial crisis was caused by the subprime mortgage lending by the US 
financial institutions and the housing bubble, which resulted in the default of the less 
creditworthy borrowers. The US financial crisis is also argued to have been precipitated by the 
insufficiently regulated banking sector.  
The crisis mostly spread to countries globally whose financial institutions were exposed to 
foreign assets.  
The Euro Zone crisis started with Greece experiencing a significant fiscal deficit in 2009. The 
fiscal deficit problems led to a decline in the investor confidence and capital inflows declined. In 
2011 and 2012, several Euro Zone countries experienced a sovereign crisis, as they had 
repeatedly experienced fiscal deficits.  
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This study, in addition, indicated a view that the first sign of the Euro crisis might have been in 
Ireland during late 2008. This is when Ireland experienced banking and fiscal problems because 
of the exposure to the US financial crisis.  
The Euro crisis spread to countries that were particularly trade linked to the Euro Zone such as 
the UK and the US. 
Section 4.3 revealed evidence on the influence of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign 
crisis on the three global macroeconomic indicators, namely world merchandise trade, world FDI 
and world GDP.  
The growth of world merchandise trade (exports and imports) reached negative levels during the 
recession in 2009 when compared to 2008. This might have been due to the decline in the global 
demand for goods and services because of the global recessionary environment. The world 
merchandise trade growth also dropped in 2011 after recovering in 2010. During 2011, one of 
the most significant trading groups, the Euro Zone, experienced a sovereign crisis which had a 
negative impact on world trade.  
The merchandise exports of regions such as Europe, Asia and North America were most affected 
during the recession. The growth rate of the merchandise exports of these regions reached 
negative levels of over 10% in 2009. In 2011, during the Euro crisis period, the growth of 
merchandise exports for all the regions decreased from 2010. 
Evidence was also presented that the world FDI flows (inflows and outflows) declined in 2009 
during the recession. It is revealed that in 2009, the world FDI flows reached their lowest levels 
when compared to the pre-crisis period of 2005-07 and beyond until 2014. The world FDI flows 
also decreased in 2012, during the Euro sovereign crisis period, when compared to 2011.  
The world GDP growth declined in 2008 and 2009 from the previous year as the global economy 
experienced a global recession. During 2008 regions such as Europe, North America and Asia 
were most affected by the recession, as they recorded the lowest annual GDP growth when 
compared to other regions. In 2012, it was only the European region that had achieved a negative 
yearly GDP growth rate. This might have been that several Euro Zone countries were still facing 
a sovereign crisis in 2012. 
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Overall, this chapter has shown the spread of the US financial crisis and the Euro sovereign crisis 
globally. Countries of the world were already trade and financially globalised preceding the two 
crises studied because of the benefits that globalisation brings. Globalisation worked as a 
mechanism that ensured that the crises speedily spread worldwide, as the negative spill-over 
effects of a crisis are rapid whenever there is some form of trade or financial integration.  
The next chapter investigates how the IMF and the World Bank dealt with the challenges 
produced by the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. It will also examine whose 
mandate was best suited for which aspect of the recession and the sovereign crisis respectively. 
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5. Chapter Five: Evaluation of the role of the IMF and the World 
Bank in responding to the Great Recession and the Euro 
sovereign crisis 
5.1  Introduction 
As we have seen from the earlier chapters, the historical role of these institutions provides the 
background in observing differences in their response to challenges before the Great Recession 
and the period under review. The literature on their criticisms permits an investigation into 
whether those points of criticisms are still relevant.  
This chapter seeks to accomplish the fourth and fifth secondary objectives defined in the first 
chapter. The organisation of the chapter is into two parts. The first section focuses on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the IMF and the World Bank. The last section provides a summary 
of the chapter. 
5.2  The strengths and weaknesses of the IMF and the World Bank 
This section analyses the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions to steer globalisation to 
the benefit of all countries and the interventionist role during times of a crisis. 
5.2.1 The International Monetary Fund  
5.2.1.1 The IMF Strengths 
I. IMF’s crisis lending  
One of the functions of the IMF is to provide temporary financial support to member countries in 
turbulent times (IMF, 2015a:4). By carrying out its lender of last resort function efficiently, the 
IMF can play a role in minimising the effects of a crisis. 
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a. The trend in the IMF’s lending  
To examine the IMF’s lending during the two crises events under review, it is necessary to 
observe the trends in the IMF assistance. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 are developed from data 
obtained from various IMF Annual Reports, to show the tendency of the IMF’s lending 
commitments during 2007-2014. Figure 5.1 focuses on the IMF’s non-concessional lending 
commitments (lending at market interest rates), while Figure 5.2 concentrates on the IMF’s 
concessional lending commitments (lending below market interest rates) both measured in 
millions of Special Drawing Rights22 (SDRs). The year 2007 is included in the pre-crisis period 
because the US crisis that became a recession started in late 2007, as previously mentioned. 
Figure 5.1 IMF's approved main/non-concessional lending arrangements 2007-2014 (in 
millions of SDRs) 23 24 25 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on IMF Annual Reports (IMF, 2008b:43; IMF, 2009e:32; IMF, 
2010a:25; IMF, 2011:23; IMF, 2012c:24; IMF, 2013a:40; IMF, 2014:34). 
                                                          
22 Interest-bearing reserve asset created to supplement members’ reserve assets. SDR holdings can also be 
exchanged with other members for freely usable currency. 
23 Due to the unavailability of data, the 2007FY is denoted by “0”. 
24 The numbers reflected in this figure include the augmentations/reductions of the amounts previously approved. 
25 The financial year of the IMF is from May to April.  
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Observing the trend of the IMF’s non-concessional lending commitments as per Figure 5.1 
between 2007 and 2014, it is apparent that there was a steep increase from 2008 to 2009 and then 
again from 2010 to 2011.  
The increase was from 899.2 (in millions of SDR) in 2008 to 65 777.3 (in millions of SDR) 
during 2009 in the midst of the recession. Figure 5.1 further illustrates that during 2011 when the 
crisis engulfed the Euro Zone, the IMF’s lending arrangements rose. During the 2011 period, the 
lending arrangements of the IMF augmented to 142 244.5 (in millions of SDR) from 77 636.3 (in 
millions of SDR) in 2010, which was an increase of approximately 83%. The IMF’s lending 
arrangements decreased significantly during 2012 and then fluctuated until 2014. 
The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF estimated that the IMF’s non-concessional 
lending, which is the form of lending to mostly the developed countries, rose from almost nil to 
approximately $400 billion during the 2008-2013 period (IEO, 2014:4). This indicates that the 
IMF started assisting the developed countries again. The developed countries withdrew from the 
IMF with regards to requesting financial assistance beginning in the 1970s as reported on earlier 
in the third chapter.  
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Figure 5.2 IMF's approved PRGT/concessional lending arrangements 2007-2014 (in 
millions of SDRs) 26 27 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on IMF Annual Reports (IMF, 2007a:38; IMF, 2008b:43; IMF, 
2009e:35; IMF, 2010a:26; IMF, 2011:24; IMF, 2012c:26; IMF, 2013a:41; IMF, 2014:34). 
According to Figure 5.2, the trend of the IMF’s concessional lending28 commitments also 
increased from 2007 until 2010. For example, there was an increase from 363 (in millions of 
SDR) during 2007 to 2 209.4 (in millions of SDR) in 2010. In 2012, during the Euro sovereign 
crisis period, the IMF’s concessional lending commitments also increased to 1 944.9 (in millions 
of SDR) from 1 130.3 (in millions of SDR) in 2011.  
This displays that the IMF was willing to also assist the developing countries, as the IMF’s 
concessional lending is the form of lending to the developing countries. 
                                                          
26 The numbers reflected in this figure include the augmentations/reductions of the amounts previously approved. 
27 The financial year of the IMF is from May to April.  
28 Lending below-market interest rates. 
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b. IMF’s previous crisis lending trends   
There is evidence that the IMF’s lending increased during the past crises. During the 1980s debt 
crisis, the IMF increased its lending to prevent an economic collapse of the affected countries 
(Güven, 2012:873). Orastean’s research also revealed that the IMF’s lending increased during 
the Mexican crisis in 1994-1995, the Asian crisis in 1997-1998, the Russian crisis in 1998, the 
Brazilian crisis in 1998-1999 and the Argentinian crisis in 1999-2002 (Orastean, 2014:414).  
c. IMF’s lending criticism 
Critics of the IMF as discussed in the third chapter stated that the demand for the IMF’s financial 
assistance is declining. This study finds that the IMF’s financing was in demand during the crisis 
periods studied. For example, there was an increase in both the concessional and non-
concessional lending arrangements that the IMF had with several countries during the crisis 
periods, as shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.  
The IMF’s involvement with the developed countries faded after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system as explained in the third chapter. The rise in the non-concessional lending 
commitments during the period studied indicates that the IMF assisted the developed countries. 
The IMF’s non-concessional lending is mostly for the developed countries.  
In summary, the IMF’s lending commitments increased to assist the countries in dire need of 
financing. The timing of the rise of the IMF’s lending commitments was when the Great 
Recession engulfed the global economy. The increase in the IMF lending commitments was also 
the case in 2011 when numerous Euro Zone countries experienced a sovereign crisis that the 
IMF’s non-concessional lending arrangements increased. 
II. The IMF’s crisis management  
To analyse the speed in which the IMF intervenes in an economic crisis, it is necessary to review 
its time frames for approving funding. There is a process that needs to be followed to get such 
financial assistance from the IMF. Figure 5.3 below has been designed to show the steps to be 
followed when a country approaches the IMF for financing.  
 
 54 
 
Figure 5.3 Process of obtaining the IMF financing 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on (IMF, 2016j:1).  
Figure 5.3 shows that first, a country approaches the IMF. The second step is for the IMF to 
determine an appropriate lending instrument based on the needs of a member in financial 
distress. Each IMF’s lending instrument has different rules and conditions that apply. The third 
step is, in consultation with the borrowing member, the IMF would formulate an economic 
policy programme as part of conditionality to lending. The economic policy programme is 
presented to the IMF Board in the form of a ‘Letter of Intent’ by the borrowing member. The 
fourth step would then involve obtaining approval from the IMF’s Board on the matter. The fifth 
step is once the approval from the IMF Board has been granted, the funding can be released in 
portions concurrently to the implementation of the economic policy programme by the 
borrowing member. 
2. Determination of the 
IMF lending instrument.
3. Formulation of the economic 
policy programme.
4. Approval from 
the IMF Board. 
5. The IMF financing released in 
phased portions.
1. Financial assistance 
request by the IMF 
member country.
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a. IMF’s crisis intervention time frames 
In the 2009 financial year, which was a time during the recession, seven out29 of the fourteen 
IMF non-concessional lending arrangements30 were approved as part of the IMF’s emergency 
financing mechanism procedures. These lending arrangements were under the IMF’s Stand-By 
Arrangement (SBA). (IMF, 2009e:32). This indicates that the IMF has been prepared to provide 
urgent financing to minimise the potential costs of an economic crisis. 
Table 5.1 displays the IMF’s crisis intervention time frames during the Euro sovereign crisis. 
This table shows the onset of the crisis, the date of the financial request. The amount and date of 
approval is also indicated in the table. 
Table 5.1 IMF's time frames in crisis intervention during the Euro sovereign crisis 
Crisis  Onset of 
the crisis 
Financial 
support request 
Financial support approval 
Euro 
sovereign 
crisis 
December 
2009 
23 April 2010 Greece-  
-SDR 26.4 billion (approximately €30 billion) 
approved on 9 May 2010 (SBA). 
- SDR 23.785 billion approved on 15 March 
2012 (4 year Extended Fund Facility (EFF))31. 
November 201032 Ireland- SDR 19.466 billion (approximately 
€22.5 billion) approved on 16 December 2010 
(3 year EFF). 
7 April 2011 Portugal- SDR 23.742 billion (Approximately 
€26 billion) approved on 20 May 2011 (3 year 
EFF). 
29 April 2013 Cyprus- SDR.891 million approved on 15 May 
2013 (3 year EFF). 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on various data (EU, 2011:4; Gibson et al. 2012:498; IMF, 
2013b:49; IEO, 2016:1-12).  
                                                          
29 Armenia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Pakistan and Ukraine. 
30 Lending at market related interest rates.  
31 The EFF arrangement was a second arrangement that replaced the SBA arrangement. The SBA is focused on 
short-term balance of payments (BoP) problems. The EFF concentrates on medium to long-term BoP problems 
which was exactly what Greece was experiencing. 
32 There is no specific date in the literature on when Ireland requested for the IMF assistance. 
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According to Table 5.1, the Euro crisis started in late December 2009 in Greece as previously 
stated. The IMF had lending arrangements with several Euro Zone countries, namely Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. 
The Euro sovereign crisis witnessed collaboration between the IMF, the European Commission 
and the European Central Bank known as the Troika. This partnership was primarily formed to 
provide emergency assistance to those countries affected by the crisis (Visvizi, 2014:335; 
Featherstone, 2015:295-310).  
The objective of this analysis is to conduct a comparative analysis of the IMF’s crisis time 
frames during the Euro crisis and past crises below. 
b. IMF’s previous crisis intervention time frames  
Table 5.2 shows the IMF’s response time frame for financial support for crises preceding the 
Great Recession. It should be stated at the outset that there was typically no criteria used in 
selecting the Mexican and Asian crises, other than just conducting a comparative analysis of the 
IMF’s crisis intervention time frames with the period studied (2007-2014). 
Table 5.2 IMF's time frames in crisis intervention during the Mexican and Asian crises 
Crisis  Onset of 
the crisis 
Financial 
support request 
Financial support approval 
Mexican 
crisis 
20 
December 
1994  
6 January 1995 Up to SDR 12,070.2 million (approximately 
$17.8 billion) on 1 February 1995 (18-month 
SBA). 
Asian crisis 2 July 1997 14 August 1997 Thailand- Up to SDR 2.9 billion approved on 
20 August 1997 (SBA). 
31 October 1997 Indonesia- Up to SDR 7.3 billion approved on 
5 November 1997 (SBA). 
3 December 
1997 
Korea- Up to SDR 15.5 billion approved on 4 
December 1997 (SBA). 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on various data (IMF, 1995; IMF, 1997a; IMF, 1997b; IMF, 1997c; 
IMF, 1998:23-32; IMF, 2012b:463-477).  
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For purposes of this analysis, the start dates for the Mexican and Asian crises were selected as 
the days when the respective currencies were devalued as per Table 5.2. The Mexican crisis of 
1994-95 started on 20 December 1994 with the devaluation of the Peso (IMF, 2012b:464-477). 
The Asian crisis of 1997-98 arose on 2 July 1997 following the devaluation of the Thai Bhat 
(IMF, 1998:27). The Mexican and Asian crises were currency crises.  
The political and economic events which took place before the devaluation of the Mexican and 
Asian currencies formed the background to the onset of these crises respectively.  In the case of 
the Mexican crisis, political economists may argue that the crisis started with the political 
instability which was the period leading up to the devaluation of the Peso. The political 
instability involved the assassination of a prominent presidential candidate known as Luis 
Donaldo Colosio during March 1994 (Gonzalez, 2015:58). This political instability led to the 
investors’ uncertainty regarding the ability of the Mexican government to conduct domestic 
policy, thus, capital outflow occurred (Mathur et al. 1998:39-40).  
Other analysts refer to the first signs of the Asian crisis in 1996 when foreign investors started to 
lose confidence in the Thai and Korean stock markets. As late as March 1997, Malaysian equity 
markets also began to decline considerably (Radelet & Sachs, 1998:17).  
This study finds that the times it took for the IMF to approve financial support in the earlier 
crises to the time it took for approvals during the Euro crisis to be reasonable in a crisis situation. 
During the Mexican crisis it took the IMF approximately twenty six days (6 Jan-1 Feb 1995). 
During the Euro sovereign crisis it took the IMF about sixteen days (23 Apr 2010-9 May 2010) 
to approve Greece’s request for financial assistance. However, during the Asian crisis, the IMF 
took a lesser time to approve funding for Thailand and Indonesia. The approval for support to 
Thailand and Indonesia was about six days (14-20 Aug 1997) and five days (31 Oct- 5 Nov 
1997) respectively. 
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During the Euro sovereign crisis which started in December 2009 in Greece, it was not until on 
23 April 2010 that Greece became the first Euro crisis country to approach the IMF for 
assistance formally as per Table 5.1. It took the Greek authorities about three months before they 
applied for the IMF financing, which is long when compared to the Mexican and Asian crises as 
per Table 5.2. This raises a question of whether countries avoid seeking the IMF’s assistance in 
the immediate period after a crisis and consider alternative sources of funding. 
In summary, the IMF has been efficient in approving financial assistance requests from countries 
encountering an economic crisis, as this was true during both the Mexican and Asian crises and 
the Euro sovereign crisis. 
5.2.1.2 The IMF’s Weaknesses 
I. IMF’s lending instruments  
This section provides an overview of the IMF’s lending instruments. This is done to examine the 
role of these instruments for the period of the study. 
The IMF has used Stand-By Arrangements since June 1952 as one of its main lending 
instruments. Through this lending instrument, the IMF member countries receive financial 
support for any balance of payments needs. This support can include financing for a member 
country’s import bill or foreign debt (Elekdağ, 2008:626-627).  
Table 5.3 displays the IMF’s lending instruments. This table consists of the name and year in 
which a particular lending instrument was adopted, the qualification criteria, conditions attached 
to the financing, as well as the repayment periods. 
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Table 5.3 IMF's lending instruments  
Year 
Adopted  
Instrument Eligibility  Conditionality Repayment Period 
1952 1. Stand-By 
Arrangement 
(SBA) 
 Financing made available to:  
o All IMF member countries with 
external financing needs. 
 Economic policies to address 
issues that led to a country 
seeking the IMF assistance. 
 3
1
4
  - 5 years. 
1974 2. Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF) 
 Financing made available to:  
o All IMF member countries with 
severe Balance of Payments 
(BoP) problems. 
 Policies to address the 
structural and economic 
difficulties. 
 4
1
2
  & 10-year 
period. 
2008 3. Exogenous Shocks 
Facility-High 
Access Component 
(ESF-HAC) and 
Exogenous Shocks 
Facility-Rapid 
Access Component 
(ESF-RAC) 
 Financing made available to:  
o Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Trust (PRGT)-eligible countries 
(low-income countries). 
 Economic programme 
concentrates on the 
adjustment of the main shock. 
 5
1
2
  & 10-year 
period. 
2009 4. Flexible Credit 
Line (FCL) 
 Financing made available to 
countries with: 
o Sound policies and history of 
good economic performance. 
 No conditionality attached to 
funding. 
 3
1
4
  - 5 years. 
2010 5. Extended Credit 
Facility (ECF) 
 Financing (medium-term 
support) made available to: 
o PRGT-eligible countries (low-
income countries) with 
extended BoP problems. 
 Countries agree to economic 
policies to aid them in 
achieving a stable 
macroeconomic position in 
the medium-term. 
 5
1
2
  years grace 
period and 10 
years till final 
maturity. 
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2010 6. Standby Credit 
Facility (SCF) 
 Financing made available to: 
o PRGT-eligible countries (low-
income countries). 
o Countries with stable 
macroeconomic conditions. 
 
 Members agree to adopt 
policies that will attain stable 
macroeconomic conditions in 
the short run. 
 A country’s resolution of 
financing and adjustment 
needs to be attained in a 2 
year period. 
 4 years grace 
Period & 8 years 
till final 
maturity. 
2010 7. Rapid Credit 
Facility (RCF) 
 Urgent funding made available 
to: 
o PRGT-eligible countries (low-
income countries). 
 
 Policies adopted under RCF 
should address the BoP needs 
in line with the poverty 
alleviation and growth goals 
of a country. 
 No ex post-funding 
programme conditionality 
applicable. 
 5
1
2
  years grace 
period and 10 
years till final 
maturity. 
2011 8. Precautionary and 
Liquidity Line 
(PLL) 
 Financing made available to 
member countries with:  
o Sound policies and who remain 
committed to such policies.  
o History of good economic 
performance. 
o With some economic 
weaknesses, as this results not 
to qualify under the FCL. 
 Biannual assessment against a 
set of economic indicators 
such as GDP, public debt, 
monetary & fiscal policy 
position and financial sector 
stability. 
 3
1
4
  - 5 years. 
2011 9. Rapid Financing 
Instrument (RFI) 
 Urgent financing available to all 
member countries. 
 No requirement for a full-
developed economic 
programme. 
 3
1
4
  - 5 years. 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on various data (IMF, 2010:22; Reichmann & de Resende, 2014:1-34; IMF, 2015b:3-32; IMF, 2016a:1-2; 
IMF, 2016b:1-2; IMF, 2016c:1-2; IMF, 2016d:1-2; IMF, 2016e:1-2; IMF, 2016f:1; IMF, 2016g:1-2; IMF, 2016h:1-2; IMF, 2016i:1). 
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Table 5.3 reflects two instruments used by members, but which have their origins prior to the 
Great Recession, namely the SBA of 1952 and the EFF of 1974. The emphasis of this 
analysis is mainly on the role of the IMF’s lending instruments which have their origins 
during 2007-2014. 
On 24 March 2009, the IMF press release indicated that the IMF Board approved an overhaul 
of the IMF’s lending framework (IMF, 2009a). The SBA was upgraded in 2009. The upgrade 
included doubling of the borrowing amounts by members and access to the IMF’s large sum 
of funds upfront. This was done in response to the global recession (IMF, 2016e:1). 
 Concessional lending instruments 
Although the IMF’s Board approved an overhaul of its lending framework in 2009, the IMF’s 
initiative for reforming its lending framework started a year earlier. It began with the 
Exogenous Shocks Facility-High Access Component (ESF-HAC) and Exogenous Shocks 
Facility-Rapid Access Component (ESF-RAC) in 2008, which succeeded the IMF’s 
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) of 2006. The ESF-HAC and ESF-RAC are under the 
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) aimed at assisting low-income countries 
in times of economic shock. The PRGT conditions are specific to the adjustment of the main 
shock.  
Table 5.3 also shows that the IMF has managed to adopt other concessional lending 
instruments focused on low-income countries, such as the Extended Credit Facility (ECF)33, 
the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and the Standby Credit Facility (SCF) during 2010. The 
financing provided under the ECF and SCF has conditions that members need to apply, while 
under the RCF there is no ex-post funding conditionality applicable.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 The Extended Credit Facility was previously known as Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility of 1999. 
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 Non-concessional lending instruments 
Table 5.3 further demonstrates that there was an introduction of the Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL)34 and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)35 during 2009 and 2011 
respectively. The financing under the FCL and PLL is associated with stringent qualification 
criteria. By way of example, to qualify for the IMF’s assistance, member countries need to 
possess very sound economic policies and a good track record of economic performance. In 
comparison to the other IMF lending instruments as per Table 5.3, the FCL has no on-going 
conditions attached to the financial assistance provided. This is because countries that qualify 
under the FCL would already have sound economic policies. The conditions attached to the 
PLL relate to the biannual assessments of economic indicators such as the GDP, monetary 
and fiscal performances.  
It should also be emphasised that with the existence of only the FCL and the PLL, the IMF 
would fail to fulfil its role as the lender of last resort, as a limited number of the IMF’s 
members with sound policies would qualify under the FCL and the PLL (Xafa, 2010:486).  
The Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)36 is financing available to all member countries as per 
Table 5.3. The conditionality under the RFI is lenient, as there is no need for a fully-
developed IMF economic programme. This leniency is because policy implementation 
capabilities of countries may be limited because of the instabilities that countries may face 
during an unexpected crisis. The RFI is similar to the concessional RCF, because of its aim of 
providing urgent financing during a crisis. The difference between the two instruments is that 
the assistance under the RFI has similar financing terms as the IMF’s SBA, the FCL and the 
PLL (IMF, 2016i).  
 
 
 
                                                          
34 The FCL replaced the Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) of 2008. 
35 The PLL broadened the scope of Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) of 2010. 
36 The RFI replaced the earlier IMF Emergency Assistance programmes, namely; the Emergency Natural 
Disaster Assistance (ENDA) of 1962 and the Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) of 1995. 
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a. Impact of the IMF’s new lending instruments37  
To assess the IMF’s performance in managing crises for the period studied, it is worth 
observing the role of its new lending instruments. Although the IMF was strategic to 
introduce new lending instruments, another set of questions arises. Firstly, have countries 
availed themselves to utilise these newly introduced instruments? This is a fair question given 
the impact of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis on the global economy 
because probably the IMF itself would have thought that its customer base was going to 
increase. Secondly, whether these lending instruments are successful in restoring business 
confidence in those countries that use them?  
For the first question, on 17 April 2009 which was during the recession, the IMF approved its 
first one-year arrangement under the FCL for Mexico of SDR38 31.5 billion which was 
approximately $47 billion. This arrangement with Mexico was the largest financial 
arrangement at that time since the IMF’s creation (IMF, 2009b). It was subsequently 
followed by the IMF’s FCL arrangements with Poland and Colombia on 6 May and 11 May 
respectively during the same year. Poland obtained a one-year approval of SDR 13.69 billion 
which was approximately $20.58 billion (IMF, 2009c), while Colombia received a one-year 
authorisation of SDR 6.966 billion which was approximately $10.5 billion (IMF, 2009d).  
Since the inception of the FCL in 2009 until 2014, it was only Colombia, Mexico and Poland 
that had applied for the FCL and they did not draw funds from it. These countries treated 
their arrangements as a precaution. Treating their arrangements as a precaution meant that 
these countries did not intend to draw finances (IMF, 2016a). 
In the case of the PLL, until mid-2014 only Morocco utilised this lending instrument 
(Reichmann & de Resende, 2014:21). For example, on 3 August 2012, the IMF approved a 
total of SDR 4,117.4 million approximately $6.21 billion (IMF, 2012a). The PCL, which is 
the PLL’s predecessor, had found only one user39 in early 2011 since its existence 
(Reichmann & de Resende, 2014:21).  
The evidence above indicates that not many countries have been keen to utilise the FCL and 
PCL now the PLL. 
                                                          
37 The new lending instruments are those that have their origins during 2007-2014. 
38 Special Drawing Right. 
39 Macedonia. 
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The IMF’s concessional lending instruments such as the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) 
also received few users in the 2009 and 2010 financial year, which was during the recession. 
During the 2009 financial year, three new ESF arrangements were approved by the IMF for 
Malawi, Kyrgyz Republic and Senegal of 52.1, 66.6 and 48.5 in millions of SDR respectively 
(IMF, 2009e:35). The IMF had four new arrangements under the ESF during the 2010 fiscal 
year. It approved 218.8 in millions of SDR for Tanzania on 29 May 2009. The IMF later 
authorised funding for Mozambique, Ethiopia and Maldives of 113.6, 153.8 and 8.2 in 
millions of SDR, respectively (IMF, 2010a:26). 
A significant number of non-concessional lending arrangements that the IMF approved 
during the 2009 and 2010 financial years, which encompass the Great Recession, were under 
the old SBA40. During the 2009 fiscal year, fourteen41 out of the fifteen approved 
arrangements were under the SBA with only the Mexicans receiving an FCL arrangement 
(IMF, 2009e:32). In the 2010 financial year, out of the fourteen newly approved 
arrangements, nine42 were under the SBA, while two43 were under the EFF (IMF, 2010a:25). 
The Euro Zone countries that requested the IMF’s assistance, namely Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus had their arrangements under the existing IMF instruments known as the 
SBA and the EFF during 2010-2013, even though the new instruments were available at that 
time (IEO, 2016:1). This shows that countries experiencing an economic crisis may desire to 
have their arrangements under the existing rather than the new instruments because of more 
lenient qualification criteria.  
For the second question, evidence on the success of an IMF lending arrangement in restoring 
business confidence for countries that utilise the IMF’s lending instruments, indicates that 
these instruments do improve business confidence even if countries do not draw from them.  
Mexico which had an FCL arrangement with the IMF in 2009 was severely affected by the 
recession. In 2009, it is stated that the IMF estimated the value of the Mexican Peso to have 
depreciated by 25% against the US Dollar (Villarreal, 2010:2).  
                                                          
40 All the IMF member countries qualify under the SBA. 
41 Armenia, Belarus, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Serbia, Seychelles, and Ukraine.  
42 Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Iraq, Jamaica, Maldives, Romania, and 
Sri Lanka. 
43 Moldova and Seychelles. 
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The Mexican per-capita GDP declined by about 10% between the second quarter of 2008 to 
the second quarter of 2009. Similar to other developing countries, the Mexican economy was 
affected by the recession through significant economic volatility and deterioration in the 
stock markets through declining asset prices. Mexico also experienced a slowdown in 
international trade with the US, as the US is one of its largest trading countries (Sanchez, 
2010:1-2). The Mexican and the US economic relationship became increasingly significant 
with the creation of the regional trade agreement in 1994 known as NAFTA44 (Weisbrot & 
Ray, 2012:3).  
With the concerns of a Mexican economic downturn, the IMF stated that the FCL 
arrangement assisted in restoring business confidence in Mexico, even though Mexico treated 
its FCL arrangement as a precaution (IMF, 2010b:7). This is supported by the research 
undertaken by the central bank of Mexico. The Mexican economic indicators such as real 
GDP growth improved. For example, from a 6.1% contraction in the real GDP growth rate in 
2009, during 2010, Mexico witnessed a real GDP growth rate of 5.5% (Banco de México, 
2011:2). The value of Mexican Peso also appreciated against the US Dollar by about 6% in 
the first quarter of 2010. This was brought about by the rise in the capital inflows to Mexico 
(Banco de México, 2010:20). 
b. IMF’s responses to previous crises 
Evaluating whether the IMF was proactively engaged in designing lending instruments meant 
for a crisis or whether it started to be only reactionary to the Great Recession and the Euro 
sovereign crisis, this study finds no differences.  
The IMF’s flexibility in dealing with a crisis was seen during the earlier post-war crises, such 
as the Suez crisis of 1956, where it provided special large packages of financing to one of the 
combatants’ countries, the UK (Maddison, 1964:176). Given the IMF’s limited resources at 
that time, its support to the UK was unusual because its Articles of Agreement prohibited it 
from financing a significant and continual outflow of capital, which was precisely what the 
UK was encountering in 1956 (Boughton, 2001:427).  
                                                          
44 North American Free Trade Agreement. 
 66 
 
 
During the 1980s-debt crisis, the IMF developed new lending instruments. It established the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)45 in 1986 as a response to the developing countries’ 
incapability to service their debts on market terms (Boughton, 2000b). The Asian crisis of 
1997-98 also led to the formation of a new lending instrument, known as the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility (SRF) (IMF, 1998:1). 
In summary, the strict qualification criteria under some of the new IMF’s lending instruments 
may explain why few countries have used these instruments and thus, the success of these 
instruments remains untested. For example, several Euro crisis countries had used the IMF’s 
EFF and SBA. Table 5.3 also provided evidence that under the SBA and the EFF all the 
member countries can qualify, while under the FCL and PLL, it is only those few countries 
with sound economic policies that can be eligible for the IMF’s financial assistance.  
II. IMF’s crisis prevention  
The primary mandate of the IMF mentioned in the third chapter is to oversee the international 
monetary system (IMF, 2015a:4). This mandate can be achieved when the IMF prevents 
crises from taking place through using its surveillance tools effectively.  
There are several tools that the IMF uses to assess the economic and financial stability of its 
members. These tools include the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Article IV Consultations. On the one hand, the GFSR and 
the WEO are prepared twice a year on a more global level and the data published on the 
IMF’s website is on the global economic and financial market developments. On the other 
hand, the Article IV Consultations are usually conducted once a year at a country level, 
whereby the IMF staff informally visits each member and collects economic data46. The IMF 
staff would then prepare a report on the findings of their visit to the IMF Board. After the 
Board’s review of the staff report and consultation with the country concerned, the country 
Article IV report is made available on the IMF’s website (IMF, 2007a:19). 
                                                          
45 The SAF was upgraded and known as the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987. 
46 The IMF staff also meets with government and central bank representatives to discuss the developments of 
economic policies of a country since their previous visit. In some instances, the IMF staff would meet with trade 
unions and academics. 
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As the basis of analysing the IMF’s surveillance framework, this study focuses on the IMF’s 
Article IV Consultation Reports. Article IV Consultations can be important because they 
assess and identify possible risks in individual countries. 
a. IMF’s crisis prevention efforts 
 US financial crisis (later the Great Recession) 
A study by Eichengreen and Woods revealed that before the US financial crisis the IMF had 
never evaluated the US financial sector. The IMF did the first review on the US during 2009-
2010 (Eichengreen & Woods, 2015:33).  
The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF also assessed the IMF’s surveillance 
performance during 2004-07, which was the period leading up to the Great Recession. The 
IEO Report revealed that “The IMF’s ability to correctly identify the mounting risks was 
hindered by a high degree of groupthink, intellectual capture, a general mind-set that a major 
financial crisis in large advanced economies was unlikely, and incomplete analytical 
approaches. Weak internal governance, including unclear lines of responsibility and 
accountability, lack of incentives to work across units and raise contrarian views, a review 
process that did not “connect the dots” or ensure follow-up, and an insular culture also played 
a big role, while political constraints may have also had some impact” (IEO, 2011:17).  
 Euro sovereign crisis  
This section concentrates on selected Euro Zone countries, namely Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal. It reviews the IMF Article IV Consultation Reports with the objective to reveal the 
IMF’s capability in assessing economic risks in countries prior to a crisis. 
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o Greece  
The Euro sovereign crisis originated in Greece in 2009, as previously mentioned. The 2006 
IMF Article IV Consultation Report for Greece indicated that, although the Greek authorities 
had reduced their fiscal deficit during 2005, further deficit reductions were necessary. The 
Greek fiscal expenditure such as on public sector wages, defence and social grants was 
relatively higher than in other countries. During this consultation, the Greek authorities had 
set targets to progressively reduce their fiscal deficit and achieve a budget balance or surplus 
by 2012 (IMF, 2007b:9-10).  
In the 2007 Greece Article IV Consultation Report, the IMF staff projections for the Greek 
general fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP for the years 2009 and 2010 was 0.9% and 0.3% 
respectively (IMF, 2008c:14). This estimate was inaccurate as, starting in late October 2009, 
the Greek newly elected government was talking about a fiscal deficit of roughly 12.8% of 
GDP for that year (IEO, 2016:9). In the end, the EU estimated the exact general fiscal deficit 
to have been approximately 13.6% of GDP in 2009 (EU, 2010:6).  
It may be that the IMF’s lower estimates of the Greek fiscal balance in the 2006 consultation 
report, was inspired by the commitment of the Greek authorities to continuously reduce their 
deficit as the basis of achieving a stable fiscal position by 2012 (IMF, 2007b:9-10). 
o Portugal  
In the 2007 Portuguese Article IV Consultation Report, the IMF praised the newly elected 
Portuguese government which came to power in 2005 for an impressive fiscal policy. The 
fiscal policy was concentrated on fiscal consolidation47. For example, in 2006, the Portuguese 
actual fiscal deficit was 3.9% of GDP, when compared to 6.1% in 2005 (IMF, 2007d:4-12).  
The IMF staff estimated the fiscal deficit of Portugal in 2009 to be 2.2% of GDP, which was 
still within the Euro Zone 3% limit for fiscal deficits (IMF, 2008d:29). This estimate by the 
IMF staff proved to be inaccurate as during 2009 the Portuguese fiscal deficit was 8.7% of 
GDP (Selvaraj, 2015:6). 
 
                                                          
47 Fiscal consolidation refers to economic policies or activities implemented by a relevant government to reduce 
its deficit or foreign debt. 
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o Ireland 
The IMF staff projections of the Irish general fiscal balance for 2007, 2008 and 2009 were 
respectively 0.8%, 0.4% and 0.2% of GDP in the 2007 Ireland Article IV Consultation 
Report. The IMF staff emphasised the possible weakening of the Irish fiscal balance in 2008 
to be as a result of the sluggish growth in the Irish government revenue. The IMF staff also 
cautioned that the Irish fiscal balance would deteriorate significantly in the presence of an 
international economic shock. This was because of the large deterioration of the Irish fiscal 
balance experienced during 2000 to 200248. It was in this context that the Irish authorities had 
agreed with the IMF to pursue a prudent fiscal policy. This was targeted at achieving a 
balanced fiscal position through the reduction in the growth of government expenditure (IMF, 
2007c:12).  
The IMF staff predictions of the Irish fiscal balance for 2009 also appeared to be incorrect. 
For example, Ireland’s fiscal deficit for 2009 was 11.4% of GDP (Selvaraj, 2015:6), 
compared to a fiscal balance of 0.2% projected by the IMF staff.  
It can be argued that the IMF did caution the Irish authorities of a possible deterioration of 
the fiscal balance if an international economic shock were to arise as discussed previously. 
The US financial crisis of 2007 that became a recession was an international economic shock. 
b. IMF’s surveillance criticism  
One of the weaknesses of the IMF cited in the third chapter is regarding its crisis prevention, 
in that it has failed to prevent crises particularly in the 1990s. There is evidence that this 
criticism is relevant as the IMF was unable to avoid two major crises such as the US financial 
crisis that was later the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. 
In summary, regarding the US financial crisis, the IMF never assessed the soundness of the 
US financial sector, which raises an important question of whether the IMF’s efforts in 
preventing crises are biased and only focused on some of its members. Further, the inaccurate 
predictions of the IMF staff on the Greek, Portuguese and Irish fiscal balance leading up to 
the Euro sovereign crisis have been one of the IMF’s weaknesses.  
                                                          
48 The Irish fiscal balance deteriorated by approximately 5 percentage points of GDP during 2000 to 2002. 
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5.2.2 The World Bank 
5.2.2.1 The World Bank’s Strength 
I. World Bank’s crisis lending  
As it can be recalled from the third chapter, the function of the World Bank49 is to lend to 
countries. The World Bank’s lending can complement that of the IMF during an economic 
crisis. 
a. The types of the World Bank’s lending instruments  
The World Bank’s lending instruments for much of its history have been in the form of two 
basic types, namely investment loans and adjustment loans50. The investment loans from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) have a long-term emphasis of approximately 5 to 10 
years to finance goods and services as part of the World Bank Group’s social and economic 
development projects. The types of the World Bank’s investment loans include Specific 
Investment Loan, Sector Investment and Maintenance Loan, Adaptable Program Loan, 
Learning and Innovation Loan, Technical Assistance Loan, Financial Intermediary Loan and 
Emergency Recovery Loan. The adjustment loans which come from the World Bank have a 
short-term emphasis of approximately 1 to 3 years and they perform a role of emergency 
financing needed for policy and institutional reforms. There are various types of the World 
Bank’s adjustment loans, namely Structural Adjustment Loan, Sector Adjustment Loan, 
Programmatic Structural Adjustment Loan and Special Structural Adjustment Loan (World 
Bank, 2001b:1-3).  
b. The trend in the World Bank lending  
Similar to the IMF, to perform an analysis of the World Bank’s lending, it is necessary to 
observe the patterns in the World Bank’s assistance during the two crisis periods. Figure 5.4 
demonstrates the World Bank’s development policy lending commitments between the pre-
crisis period of 2005-07 and beyond until 2014. The year 2007 is in the pre-crisis period 
because the US financial crisis started during late 2007. 
                                                          
49 The World Bank is in the form of the IBRD and the IDA as previously mentioned. The other institutions such 
as the IFC, MIGA and the ICSID form part of the World Bank Group. 
50 The adjustment lending is now known as development policy lending.  
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Figure 5.4 World Bank's development policy lending commitments 2005-2014 (in 
million $)51 52 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on various World Bank Annual Reports (World Bank, 2007; 
World Bank, 2008; World Bank, 2010:8; World Bank, 2011:5; World Bank, 2015:58).  
According to Figure 5.4, it is apparent that the trend of the IBRD development policy lending 
commitments fluctuated from the pre-crisis period (2005-2007) until 2014. For example, 
from a pre-crisis average of $4 268 million, the amount of lending commitments declined 
slightly to $3 967 million in 2008. In 2009 as the US financial crisis turned into a recession, 
the IBRD commitments more than tripled to reach $15 532 million.  
                                                          
51 The pre-crisis average data for the IBRD and the IDA was obtained from the 2007 World Bank Annual 
Report. 
52 The financial year of the World Bank is from July to June. 
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During 2010, this number further increased to reach $20 588 million before fluctuating in the 
subsequent years to achieve an average of about $8 734 million (2011-2014). Although there 
was a fluctuation of the IBRD lending commitments during 2011-2014, this was still above 
the pre-crisis levels of 2005 to 2007.  
There is an indication that the IDA’s lending commitments also increased in 2009 during the 
Great Recession. For example, in 2009 the IDA’s commitments stood at $2 820 million, 
which was approximately an increase of 10% from an average of $2 570 million in the 
preceding four years (2005-2008), as per the calculations based on Figure 5.4.  
There was, in addition, an increase in the development policy lending commitments as a 
percentage of the total IBRD lending commitments during 2009. For example, during the pre-
crisis period (2005-2007) the percentage of development policy lending commitments was 
approximately 32% of the total IBRD lending commitments ($4 268 million as a share of 
$13 525 million measured by averages) (World Bank, 2007). By 2009, the development 
policy lending commitments formed approximately 47% of the total IBRD lending 
commitments ($15 532 million as a share of $32 911 million) (World Bank, 2010:8).  
The evidence on the lending role of the World Bank is supported by a study conducted by 
Bazbauers, which shows that the World Bank assisted several East Asian countries53 during 
the Great Recession (Bazbauers, 2014:142-146). 
Since the 2007 US financial crisis intensified with the insolvency of major US financial 
institutions in 2008, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) played a role particularly in 
the banking sector. This is based on the fact that the function of the IFC as previously 
mentioned is to provide loans, equity and advisory services to the private sector. The IFC 
initiated new crisis response initiatives in both investment and advisory services to increase 
the development impact (World Bank, 2009:2).  
 
 
 
                                                          
53 Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam.  
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A higher proportion, which is 33 of the 50 financial sector projects sampled during the Great 
Recession, was projects in response to the recession. Between the 2009 fiscal year and the 
third quarter of 2011, an estimated 63% ($16.9 billion of $26.9 billion) of the IFC 
investments were in the financial sector. The IFC started regional initiatives particularly in 
Easter Europe (IEG, 2012:78-79) and its investment lending was also seen in Sub-Saharan 
Africa during the recession (IEG, 2009b:v).  
c. World Bank’s previous crisis lending trends  
Comparing the World Bank’s lending trends in the past to the crisis events under review, it is 
found that in the past, the World Bank’s lending increased during a period of a crisis. The 
1980s-debt crisis brought about an increase in the World Bank’s adjustment loan 
commitments to $6.5 billion in 1989 from a modest $0.5 billion in 1980 (Jayarajah & 
Branson, 1995:108).  
d. World Bank’s former responses to a crisis 
This study finds no differences in how the World Bank responded to previous crises 
compared to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. In response to the past crises 
such as the 1980s-debt crisis, the World Bank started the issue of Structural Adjustment 
Loans (SALs) (Sharma, 2013:669). Further, through its Special Action programme between 
the period 1984 and 1985, the World Bank worked towards preventing an economic collapse 
by urgently injecting $4.5 billion in aid into forty-four countries (Sanford, 1988:261).  
During the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, the World Bank introduced the Special Structural 
Adjustment Loans (SSALs) for countries affected by the crisis (De Janvry & Dethier, 
2012:12).  
During the Great Recession, the World Bank responded with a Global Food Crisis Response 
Program (GFRP) to curb the adverse consequences resulting from high food prices on the 
world’s poor (IEG, 2009b:7; World Bank, 2013). The World Bank’s response with the GFRP 
is based on the fact that when the recession arrived, a substantial number of the developing 
countries were still wounded both socially and economically by the global food crisis which 
occurred before the recession. Such a response from the World Bank was quite prudent given 
its institutional focus on development (UN, 2011).  
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In 2012, another new World Bank lending instrument, Program-for-Results (P4R), was 
created. There is, however, no evidence that the establishment of the P4R lending instrument 
was in response to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis (Cormier, 2016:209-
220). The P4R was introduced to shift the World Bank’s lending to be more results driven 
(IEG, 2015:1).  
e. World Bank’s lending criticisms 
First, one of the criticisms of the World Bank mentioned in Chapter Three is on its declining 
lending role. This decline in lending is because countries’ have greater access to private 
capital markets than when the World Bank was first established. It is found that the World 
Bank and its institutions played a vital lending role during the Great Recession, as their 
lending commitments and credits increased. This increased lending during the crises provides 
evidence that the World Bank still has a lending role to play in the globalised world, 
regardless of the existence of the private capital markets.  
Ravallion explains that the private capital flows cannot reach all the developing countries, as 
some developing countries have weak financial markets (Ravallion, 2016:80). 
Second, the World Bank was criticised for its complex mandate and goal congestion. This 
study finds that the World Bank had a diversified role in managing the Great Recession, as its 
institutions played various roles. The World Bank lent to governments in developing 
countries such as the Asian countries. The IFC initiated crisis response projects meant for the 
private sector during the recession in regions such as Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In summary, the World Bank’s response, particularly to the Great Recession, has been its 
strength, as it has augmented its lending capacity. The evidence is also presented above to 
testify that the World Bank’s affiliate, the IFC, got involved with projects aimed at 
responding to the recession.  
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5.3 Summary  
The IMF and the World Bank played an essential role in responding to the harmful effects of 
the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. Section 5.2 indicated that the two 
institutions increased the lending commitments during the two crises. The IMF also approved 
the financial assistance requests from countries within reasonable time frames, to minimise 
the effects of the crises by restoring business confidence. 
Section 5.2 also showed that the success of the IMF’s new lending instruments that have their 
origins in 2007-2014 remain untested so far. Quite a few countries have used these 
instruments. The crisis prevention ability of the IMF is questionable. The IMF has not been 
able to provide warning signs of a possibility of an economic crisis, even in the presence of 
its surveillance tools. 
Overall, this chapter revealed that the World Bank Group’s lending was suited to the 
recession and the Euro crisis. The World Bank is an international institution focused on 
lending to countries. The IMF was also suited to respond to the two crises through its lending 
and development of several lending instruments. One of the functions of the IMF is to 
provide temporary financing during times of a crisis. 
The next chapter concludes on the research question and objectives of the study mentioned in 
the first chapter. It will also outline the lessons learnt from the response of these institutions 
to the international economic crises studied, as well as areas for future research. 
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6. Chapter Six: Conclusion and Future research 
6.1  Conclusion 
6.1.1 Conclusion on the research question and objectives 
The method of research was entirely a literature study to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the two international institutions in responding to international economic 
crises. The research methodology adopted was to systemise the published literature around 
the role of global governance institutions during the two economic crises, which has not yet 
been the emphasis of several research projects.  
The primary objective of this study was to determine the role played by these institutions 
during the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis in a globalised world. To achieve 
this objective, it was necessary to reveal the facts with regards to the secondary objectives.  
The secondary objectives were, first, to explain the different ways in which the globalisation 
concept is defined and to briefly describe its origins. Second, it was to discuss the historical 
and changing roles, as well as the criticisms of the two institutions. Third, it was to provide a 
summary of the causes, spread and impact of the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign 
crisis in the global economy. Fourth, it was to examine the responses of the IMF and the 
World Bank to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. Fifth, it was to reveal the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two institutions as displayed by their responses to the two 
international economic crises considered. 
Chapter Two fulfilled the first secondary objective on the definitions of globalisation and its 
historical roots. It showed that globalisation has different interpretations as authors refer to 
the economic and non-economic definitions of globalisation. Authors who defined 
globalisation in respect of economic activities referred to factors such as FDI, international 
trade, and internationalisation of production and markets to be one of the features of 
globalisation. Some researchers who defined globalisation to include non-economic activities 
mentioned cultural, political and environmental aspects attached to globalisation.  
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The process of globalisation is also not a new phenomenon as it traces back several years 
ago. For example, evidence of people travelling across national borders as early as the 
fourteenth century was presented. The globalisation events other than migration took place 
later, such as trade liberalisation in the 1780s, technological improvements in the nineteenth 
century and 1990s that accelerated the process of globalisation and the growth of FDI in the 
1980s. 
The second secondary objective on the historical roles and criticisms of these institutions was 
met in Chapter Three. The lesson taken from that chapter is that the crises and globalisation 
events that took place after the Second World War had an impact on the original roles of the 
IMF and the World Bank. This led to a shift in their original roles over time, as they adapted 
their roles to suit the changing global economic environment. They have also performed their 
roles in the face of several criticisms, of which some of these criticisms are no longer 
relevant.  
Chapter Four addressed the third secondary objective. The chapter indicated that the US 
financial crisis (later the Great Recession) was triggered by the sub-prime lending by 
financial institutions, as well as lack of banking regulation. The crisis spread globally more 
especially to financial institutions of countries that were financially globalised to the US. 
African countries such as South Africa were not affected by the crisis through the financial 
sector, as South African financial institutions are well regulated.  
The South African financial system is strengthened by the adoption of the Twin Peaks model 
through the implementation of the Financial Sector Regulation Act in 2017. The Twin Peaks 
model and the Financial Sector Regulation Act, however, fall outside the scope of this 
research project. 
The Euro crisis was caused by fiscal deficits that were experienced repeatedly by the Euro 
Zone countries. The crisis spread to countries that were particularly trade linked to the Euro 
Zone.  
Chapter four also provided evidence on the adverse effects of the two crises events on the 
global macroeconomic indicators such as merchandise trade, FDI and GDP.  
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The fourth and fifth secondary objectives are achieved in Chapter Five. The evidence is 
presented in section 5.2 that these institutions played a significant role, mainly through their 
lending in response to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. Their role during 
these two crises demonstrated their strengths and weaknesses.  
The IMF strengths have been its crisis lending and time frames in intervening during a crisis 
after a country has filed a financial assistance request. For example, the IMF’s lending 
commitments increased during the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis, which 
demonstrates that the increase may have been in response to these crises. The IMF had also 
approved financial assistance requests by its members within reasonable time frames.  
It is observed that the IMF’s weakness has been the limited impact of its new lending 
instruments. This is based on the fact that few countries have shown interest in using the 
IMF’s new lending instruments during 2007-2014. The majority of its members mostly used 
its old lending instruments such as the SBA. The IMF crisis prediction and prevention efforts 
have also been its weakness. The IMF has failed to prevent two major crises that took place 
during the period reviewed, namely the US financial crisis that later became the Great 
Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis.  
Since the World Bank is a development institution, the only way that it was going to play a 
role in a globalised world was to lend in times of financial distress. This study has similar to 
the IMF, revealed that its lending had been its strength. This is based on the World Bank’s 
lending, which increased significantly during the Great Recession to assist countries to cope 
with the recession. 
On the issue whether these two institutions promote the interests of the developed countries at 
the expense of the developing ones as mentioned in Chapter One, this claim is found to be 
inaccurate. The IMF and the World Bank provided their assistance to both the developed and 
developing countries during the crisis periods studied. The IMF also established lending 
instruments to suit both the developed and developing countries, as it introduced both 
concessional and non-concessional lending tools.  
Overall, the strengths of these institutions outweigh their weaknesses. However, the 
weaknesses of the IMF, especially its crisis prediction and prevention show that it should 
revisit its role to identify its failures and learn from them.  
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6.1.2 Conclusion on the lessons of the response of these institutions to the Great 
Recession and Euro sovereign crisis 
This study did not find any substantial differences in how the two institutions dealt with past 
crises and the two crisis events studied. Regarding the rise of the IMF and the World Bank’s 
lending commitments during the crisis periods reviewed, it was indicated that even during the 
previous crises periods, such as in the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF and the World Bank lending 
trends increased.  
On the subject of the IMF and the World Bank’s flexibility in responding to a crisis, it was 
revealed that these institutions have been proactively engaged in making efforts particular to 
a crisis.  
In the case of the IMF, the overhaul of its lending framework led to the introduction of new 
lending tools. During the 1980s-debt crisis and the 1990s Asian crisis, the IMF also 
developed new instruments in response to these crises. The World Bank, since it is a 
development institution, initiated a Global Food Crisis Response Program in response to the 
Great Recession. Even during the previous crises such as the 1980s-debt crisis, there was an 
introduction of adjustment lending programmes, while in response to the 1990s Asian crisis 
the Special Structural Adjustment Loans were created.  
The IMF’s surveillance before the Great Recession and the period after found somewhat 
similar results as discussed in section 5.2.1.2. It was discovered that before the Euro 
sovereign crisis, the IMF’s staff projections of several Euro Zone countries’ fiscal balance 
were inaccurate. This is not different to the period preceding the US financial crisis that later 
became the Great Recession. For example, the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF had 
also exposed the incomplete analytical approaches by the IMF as one of the causes for its 
incapability in identifying potential risks of a crisis occurring. 
On the issue of whether some of the criticisms that have been named against these institutions 
in performing their respective roles in the globalised world are still relevant, several 
observations have been made. 
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Concerning the IMF, some criticisms are relevant, while others are irrelevant. This study 
found the criticism that the IMF’s lending role has diminished not to be accurate. There was a 
rise in the IMF concessional lending commitments for the developing countries, as well as its 
non-concessional lending commitments for the developed countries.  
The critique of the IMF’s inability to identify and prevent crises through its surveillance 
function appeared to be relevant. It was also shown that even in the presence of the IMF’s 
surveillance tools, the IMF has failed to prevent the Euro sovereign crisis and the US 
financial crisis which later became the Great Recession. In the case of the US financial crisis, 
the IMF might have been biased in its efforts for evaluating the economic and financial 
stability of the US, as it only began assessing the US financial sector after a crisis had 
occurred. Leading up to the Euro sovereign crisis, the inaccurate IMF staff projections of 
some of the Euro Zone countries’ fiscal balance were observed.  
Shifting the focus to the World Bank, the criticisms are on its diminishing lending role and 
complex mandate. These criticisms are found not to be relevant. The World Bank played a 
role during the Great Recession as it lent to several East Asian countries that were affected by 
the recession. There was also evidence of an increase in the World Bank’s lending 
commitments more especially in the form of the IBRD during the recession and Euro 
sovereign crisis periods.  
It was also found that the World Bank and the institutions that form part of the World Bank 
Group such as the IFC played diversified roles. For example, the World Bank focused on 
lending to governments in developing countries in East Asia, while the IFC concentrated on 
projects aimed at the private sector during the recession. This shows that the World Bank 
Group institutions have complementary roles, as shown by their response to the Great 
Recession.  
The IMF and the World Bank are now better equipped to deal with global economic crises, as 
they learned from previous crises. These institutions have also shown that they are prepared 
to reform their lending roles. For example, the IMF has introduced several lending 
instruments over time aimed at specific purposes.  
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6.2  Future research 
This study was not aimed at analysing any particular policy proposal that originated from 
these two institutions. Instead, it investigated their response to the Great Recession and Euro 
sovereign crisis. It is envisaged that specific policy proposals directed at specific situations 
and possibly confined to particular countries, could be the topic of several independent 
research projects on each of the two institutions. 
The study also did not analyse the effects of the IMF and World Bank programmes on 
countries that received funding from these two institutions. Forthcoming studies can 
investigate the role of the IMF and World Bank’s supported programmes during the recession 
and Euro crisis. 
The research project was, in addition, limited to the role of the IMF and the World Bank. 
Future research can examine the role of other international groupings such as the G20, 
regional development banks and international institutions with a financial stability mandate 
such as the BIS54 in responding to the Great Recession and the Euro sovereign crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Bank for International Settlements. 
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